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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 43 1998 NUMBER 3
DECONSTRUCTING HEARSAYS STRUCTURE: TOWARD A
WITNESS RECOLLECTION DEFINITION OF HEARSAY
MARILYN J. IRELAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
H EARSAY testimony is "nothing more than dual (or multiple) ordinary
testimony." The Anglo-American system depends upon witnesses
presenting evidence live in open court making the exclusion of hearsay
from trials essential. 2 The rule against hearsay is the primary mechanism
for protecting this form of litigation.3 Exclusion of hearsay, therefore, is
*Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. I am grateful to the
many research assistants at California Western School of Law and to the editors
and staff of the Villanova Law Review who have made valuable contributions to the
form and scholarship of this article. I would also like to thankJohn Rice, Esq. who,
as a student and without remuneration or academic credit, made of himself an
expert on Wigmore so that I would have someone with whom to exchange ideas
about the evolution of hearsay doctrine. I also am grateful to Professor Ron
Carlson, who kindly reviewed an early version of the manuscript and made
valuable suggestions and offered encouragement.
1. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 377 (2d ed.
1931) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OFJUDICIAL PROOF].
2. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay-What Is It?, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1937)
(recognizing importance of hearsay rule in eliminating court's admission of delib-
erate falsehoods, as well as "faults in ... perception, memory, and narration of...
witnesses," in situations where opposing counsel does not have opportunity to
cross examine declarant of statement in live trial); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 1362, at 3 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE] (tracing his-
tory and nature of hearsay while ultimately concluding that "fundamental test,
shown by experience to be invaluable, is . . test of [c]ross examination").
3. See 5 WIcMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 7 ("It is thus apparent
that the essence of the Hearsay rule is a requirement that testimonial assertions
shall be subjected to the test of cross examination [coupled with the oath].").
Cross examination and the adversarial trial process are symbiotic. For example,
the frequently used justification for confrontation in an adversarial trial is that it
provides an opportunity for cross examination. See Carl C. Wheaton, What Is Hear-
say?, 46 IowA L. REV. 210, 221 (1961) ("[T]he only purpose served by confronta-
tion is that it provides an opportunity for cross examination."); see also Frank M.
Tuerkheimer, Convictions Through Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: A Logical Pro-
gression Back to Square One, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 49 (1988) ("There appears little
doubt that the principal reason for the exclusion of hearsay is that hearsay evi-
dence deprives the person against whom the evidence is admitted of the right to
cross examine the witness that matters.").
(529)
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fundamental to preserve the Anglo-American adversarial trial.4 As cur-
rently defined, however, the hearsay rule represents a complex jumble of
concepts in which the exceptions virtually swallow the rule. Both the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and related state codifications present a structure
of analysis that has proved unworkable for the trial lawyer hurried by the
rapid pace of a modern trial.5 In a criminal case, Confrontation Clause
issues arising from the accused's Sixth Amendment constitutional rights
further complicate the analysis.
6
Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a state-
ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
7
Professor McCormick, a renowned evidence law scholar, stated, "A defini-
tion cannot, in a sentence or two, furnish ready answers to all the complex
problems of an extensive field, such as hearsay."8 Perhaps more should be
expected than the obviously over-inclusive definition set forth in Rule 801,
which requires for its implementation two exemptions, twenty-seven spe-
cific exceptions (some with multiple parts) and an invitation to the courts
to invent more.
9
The complex structure of hearsay, riddled as it is with exceptions, has
led various legal scholars to suggest that our justice system abolish the
4. See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note ("The factors to be consid-
ered in evaluating the testimony of a witness are perception, memory, and narra-
tion."). The Committee discussed the importance of witness's testifying accurately
and the importance of discovering any inaccuracies in the witness's testimony. See
id. (explaining reasons for excluding hearsay). Therefore, "the Anglo-American tra-
dition has evolved three conditions [as part of the hearsay rule] under which witnesses will
ideally be required to testify: (1) under oath, (2) in the personal presence of the trier
of fact, and (3) subject to cross examination." Id.
5. SeeJames W. McElhaney, The Real Witness, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 82, 82,
84 (1988) (discussing "awkwardness" of hearsay rule and suggesting instead "real
witness" test of (1) veracity of in-court witness and (2) fundamental question of
whether out-of-court declarant is really witness).
6. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.75, at
1092 n.1 (1995) (questioning whether hearsay doctrine and its exceptions control
or affect meaning of Confrontation Clause and whether, in criminal cases, Con-
frontation Clause drives hearsay doctrine). The authors note the emerging "pro-
cedural rights" theory as one potential method to handle this controversy. See id.
§ 8.75, at 1096 ("Modern scholars have begun to argue that the clause does not bar
hearsay as such, but should be read to prevent the state from building its case
against criminal defendants by gathering out-of-court statements and offering
them in lieu of live testimony.")
7. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
8. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246, at 97 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
9. See FED. R. EviD. 801 (d) (listing exemptions of "prior statement by witness"
and "admission by party-opponent"); FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23) & 804(b)(1)-(4)
(listing 27 exceptions, including "excited utterance" and "public records and re-
ports"); FED. R. EVID. 807 (offering "invitation" for courts to make further excep-
tions); see also J.P. McBaine, Admissibility in California of Declarations of Physical or
Mental Condition, 19 CAL. L. REV. 231, 231 n.4 (1931) ("It is thought it is not strictly
logical to frame a definition or a rule and at the same time, or later, announce
other rules or definitions and call them exceptions to the rule.").
[Vol. 43: p. 529
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rule.10 Perhaps we should change the rule against hearsay for policy rea-
sons related to excessive time and expense or because of the excessively
adversarial nature of our justice system. 1 The problems associated with
the unwieldy structure of hearsay analysis, however, are not insufficient
alone to justify such revolutionary change, at least until our system at-
tempts more modest approaches. The redefinition of hearsay to include
the additional element of recollection results in a simplification of the
analytic framework. This Article attempts to incorporate recollection into
the revamped definition of hearsay, consistent with the rationalist base of
modern hearsay doctrine.' 2
A rule that is more an exception than a rule is a rule that is not prop-
erly defined. The presence of a large number of exceptions to a rule sug-
gests, at a minimum, the presence of a missing element that is common to
a substantial number of exceptions.' 3 The redefinition proposed here at-
tempts to include the missing element of recollection. Our legal system
should redefine hearsay to include only those out-of-court statements that
rely on both the veracity of the declarant and the accuracy of his or her
recollection of past events. This would make the effect of the rule consis-
10. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.0, at 188
(4th ed. 1996) ("Criticisms of this scheme are that it is bulky and complex, fails to
screen good from bad hearsay realistically, and inhibits the growth of the law of
evidence."). Graham suggests abolishing the rule against hearsay and admitting all
hearsay. See id.; see also Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the
Rule and Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723, 723-24 (1992) (arguing for abolishment
of hearsay rule and implementation of "far simpler set of specific rules"); Franklin
Strier, MakingJury Trials More Truthfu4 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 111 (1996) (ques-
tioning perpetuation of hearsay rule because presumption of juror incompetence
undergirding exclusion of hearsay is anachronistic); Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abol-
ish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. PITT. L. REv. 609, 628 (1974) (arguing that rule
against hearsay should be abolished because in most cases trier of fact will not be
misled by admission of hearsay). But see Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule,
75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1987) (identifying reasons to reject abolition of rule,
including notion that rule "buttresses ... rationalist assumptions underlying adju-
dicative factfinding and implements . . . traditional assignment of comparative
burdens borne by ... parties"). Some would not eliminate hearsay entirely, but
would permit the rule to be overcome by either: (1) a showing of necessity; (2) the
policy embodied in Rule 503(a) from the "hearsay-friendly," but never enacted,
Model Code of Evidence of 1942; or (3) some other foundation. See Roger Park, A
Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1987) (discuss-
ing institutions and how they attempted to simplify or abolish hearsay).
11. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POt,
ICY RESEARCH, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 34-35 (1984)
(noting that two most frequently voiced criticisms of adversary system are that strict
evidence codes, including hearsay rule, make system too slow to serve needs of
modern society and place low value on discovery of truth).
12. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (1992) (stating that rationalist viewpoint
characterizes current hearsay doctrine as "picture of order and rationalism" when
in actuality it seems "chaotic and irrational, like noisy traffic at a congested
intersection").
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tent with what is normally understood to be the function of witnesses giv-
ing testimony. Only those statements based on recollection of a witness
are testimony of such a nature as to require in-court recitation, subject to
operation of the rule against hearsay.
The redefined rule needs to focus on the goal of excluding out-of-
court testimony; that is, our system should define the hearsay rule to for-
bid only out-of-court declarations where the veracity and accuracy of recol-
lection of past observations is crucial. This redefinition would
substantially simplify hearsay analysis, eliminating the need for most hear-
say exceptions. Because any changes to the rule would remain subject to
countervailing broad and narrow interpretations by the courts, there
would be no shift in the overall balance of admissibility for particular evi-
dence.14 The result, however, would be a simpler and more logical struc-
ture of analysis. In spite of the additional length of the proposed
definition, the resulting elimination of a myriad of hearsay exceptions
counteracts the additional burden. Further, the proposed definition com-
ports with the day-to-day thought processes of the experienced trial attor-
ney.1 5 The redefinition also makes it easier for the courts to reconcile a
witness' recollection, governed by the testimonial hearsay standard, with
Confrontation Clause analysis.
Part II of this Article examines why the truth-based definition of hear-
say has such resiliency, in spite of its defects.1 6 Part II suggests three rea-
sons for the sturdiness of the current formulation. First, scholars may be
reluctant to meddle with the definition of hearsay because they pay great
deference to the legendary legal mind of Dean Wigmore 1 7 Second, the
current structure is a monument to that school of thought that views law as
science, a school of thought that remains highly influential.18 Third and
14. Compare White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (supporting narrow reformulation that would retain Confrontation Clause
when prosecutor's use of extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimo-
nial materials constitutes abuse), with Kenneth E. Kraus, Comment, The Recent Per-
ception Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A Justifiable Track Record, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
1525, 1531-32 (1985) (arguing for broadening of admissible hearsay through
adoption of "recent perception exception," which allows for admission of state-
ments thought to be "inherently trustworthy").
15. See McElhaney, supra note 5, at 82, 84 (offering practical experiences of
trial attorney in line with proposed definition). Professor McElhaney's observa-
tions evoke praise from other legal scholars. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Law Pro-
fessor Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. REv. 1, 5 n.22 (1993) ("No
one writes easier to read, more intelligent, more insightful, more useful articles
about in-trial applications of the rules of evidence than Professor McElhaney.")
16. For a discussion of why the truth-based standard for hearsay remains, see
infra notes 28-114 and accompanying text.
17. For a full discussion of Wigmore's theory and influence, see infra notes
32-61 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the law of science that led to the current definition of
hearsay, see infra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
532 [Vol. 43: p. 529
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finally, the truth standard contains an intuitive appeal, for who can argue
with truth, especially in the context of a trial of the facts. 19
After rationally deconstructing the intuitive and emotional appeal of
a truth-based definition, it becomes possible to search for alternative for-
mulations. Part III discusses United States Supreme Court cases decided
before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with the objective
of drawing the line between admissible and inadmissible out-of-court testi-
mony.20 It also reviews analogous Supreme Court cases decided under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 21
Part IV searches for a common thread in the hearsay exceptions
found in Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 22 These can be
roughly categorized as either: (1) res gestae or (2) recorded matter.23 Res
gestae is a concept virtually abandoned by scholarly consensus.24 Professor
Morgan has thoroughly dissected instances of admissible hearsay, in the
past admitted as res gestae and currently codified, in part, in the first three
subsections of Rule 803.25 Part IV suggests that, rather than dissect the
ambiguous res gestae, efforts at reform should search for the concept's com-
19. For a discussion of the appeal of a truth-based definition, see infra notes
79-114 and accompanying text. Truth seems to be a proper and sufficient test
because the word has so many conflated and inconsistent meanings, all of them
supremely positive in connotation.
20. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's approach to hearsay admissibility
prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see infra notes 115-62 and
accompanying text.
21. For a review of analogous Supreme Court cases decided under the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause, see infra notes 163-90 and accompanying
text. In both bodies of case law, an important distinction between primary and
secondary testimony emerges, with the recollection of past events at the core of
this distinction.
22. For a discussion of the similarities among the exceptions to the hearsay
rule, see infra notes 191-239 and accompanying text. "Declarant unavailable" ex-
ceptions under Rule 804(b) are for the most part secondary forms of evidence and
therefore will not be examined for threads of commonality among the primary
hearsay "exceptions." See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (providing exceptions to hearsay
rule only when declarant is unavailable).
23. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(18) (containing two conceptually-based excep-
tions: res gestae and other rules for addressing recollection and recorded matter);
see also FED. R. EvID. 803 (20)-(21) (creating exceptions for reputation evidence
necessary because of common law rule against opinion evidence).
24. See 6 WIcMoRE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1767, at 182 ("The phrase 'res
gestae' has long been not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful.... It
ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phrase-
ology."); see also GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 803.2, at 396-97 (stating that reference to
common law phrase is "improper and should be avoided").
25. See Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as
Res gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 229-39 (1922) [hereinafter Suggested Classification] (out-
lining several classes of cases that employ "res gestae" as "convenient obscurity" or to
"bewilder and perplex"). Morgan's stinging criticism of res gestae aside, the Federal
Rules, as they currently stand, incorporate several of the phrase's key concepts.
See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(1)-(2) (retaining ideas inherent to res gestae, such as
"present sense impression" and "excited utterance").
19981
5
Ireland: Deconstructing Hearsay's Structure: Toward a Witness Recollection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43: p. 529
mon element, which is that the statements are not backward-looking and,
therefore, not testimonial.
Part V concludes that our system should redefine hearsay to apply
only to backward-looking statements. 26 The effect would be to focus hear-
say solely on testimonial statements, excluding from the operation of the
rule all other out-of-court statements for which cross examination is not an
appropriate safeguard. The witness who is needed in court, live and avail-
able for cross examination, is the witness who testifies as to remembered
past events. The hearsay definition should focus on this necessity of the
adversarial trial and not on a "truth of the matter asserted" rule. The Ap-
pendix suggests how Rule drafters might reformulate the Federal Rules of
Evidence to focus on the distinction between testimonial and nontestimo-
nial statements. 27
II. DECONSTRUCTING TRUTH
So entrenched is the current definition of hearsay that it is impossible
to look beyond it to some other possibility without first examining why the
rule, as currently formulated, has become so much a part of the catechism
of evidence law.28 In deconstructing the "truth of the matter" standard,
we must examine three elements that have contributed to the rigidity of
the rule.
The first of these elements is that our legal system attributes the defi-
nition of hearsay to Dean Wigmore, a scholar to whom much is owed in
rationalizing and organizing the jumble of hearsay holdings that plagued
26. For a discussion of reform proposals seeking to redefine hearsay to apply
only to backward-looking statements, see infra notes 240-43 and accompanying
text.
27. See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAw AND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 215 (3d ed. 1996) (defining hearsay and listing faulty perception, inaccu-
rate memory, insincerity and ambiguity as four testimonial dangers making hearsay
inadmissible). For an example of how the Federal Rules of Evidence might be
reformulated to focus on the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements, see infra Appendix A.
28. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay using "truth of the matter as-
serted" standard). Rule 801(c) provides: "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id. (emphasis added); see 2 WIGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 2, § 1364, at 1680 (stating that hearsay rule prohibits use of
person's assertions "as equivalent to testimony to ... fact asserted unless "assertor is
brought to testify in court") (emphasis added); see also FED. R. EviD. 801 (a) (exhib-
iting modern tendency to limit hearsay to statements that are "assertions"). The
effect of Rule 801(a), for the most part, is to reduce the operative scope of the
hearsay rule to declarative sentences. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Definition of
Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 52 (1982) (noting that
"attempt to delete from the hearsay concept all out-of-court verbal expressions that
are not simple, direct assertions of the matter they are offered to prove is a novelty
so unsound, both in principle and in practice, that one cannot help but surmise
that the Committee did not fully understand the results of its handiwork").
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the trial lawyer and judge in the early part of the twentieth century. 29 The
second element addresses an additional reason for the continued reliance
on the "truth of the matter" definition and resulting elegant organiza-
tional structure. This remarkable structure is the product of the science-
oriented zeitgeist of legal scholarship, of which Wigmore was a prominent
spokesperson. 30 The third element of Part II is an attempt to deconflate
the meaning of truth as an essentialist concept with profound appeal. If
our system had consistently used an unconflated synonym of truth in our
definition of hearsay, such as veracity, it might have been easier to see that
some other element was at work in the process of determining the scope
of admissible out-of-court statements. 3 1
A. The Eminent Wigmore
It would be impossible to overstate how important the scholarly con-
tributions of Dean Wigmore have been to the field of evidence law. Schol-
ars, practitioners and students of the law have praised his treatise as "the
most complete and exhaustive treatise on a single branch of our law that
has ever been written."32
If a lesser scholar than Wigmore had postulated the current defini-
tion, our system might have challenged the definition long ago. By often
crediting the definitional "truth of the matter asserted" formulation to
Wigmore, we give it a borrowed prestige and status. It is true that Wig-
more did use such a formulation. 33 In his extensive discussions of the
essence of hearsay, however, Wigmore focused primarily on the relation-
29. See Peter Tillers & David Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 MINN. L. REV. 813, 813
(1992) (defining Wigmore as "paterfamilias of modem American evidence
scholarship").
30. See WiLLAm R. RoALE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE 90 (1977) (indicating that
Wigmore made two scientific legal proposals and explaining proposals). Wigmore
proposed "'to offer tentatively a terminology for legal science"' and "'to make a
plea for the special study of one part of legal science,' i.e., nomo-thetics as that
branch of legal science which tests a proposed or actual rule of law by asking
whether it ought to be the law by some standard of ethics or economics .... " Id.
(quotingJohn H. Wigmore, The Terminology of Legal Science (with a Plea for the Science
of Nomo-thetics), 28 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1914)).
31. See SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, WHAT Is LAw? 85 (1989) (commenting upon
connection between evidence and truth). In a statement that appears especially
relevant to the hearsay situation, Sinha noted, "Evidence guarantees the truth of a
proposition only when the feeling of evidence is accompanied by a state of affairs
that makes the proposition true ...... Id.
32. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 37 HARv. L. REV. 513, 513 (1924).
Further, Wigmore's scholarly contributions were not limited to the field of evi-
dence. See RoALFE, supra note 30, at 82 (listing Wigmore's scholarly contributions
and stating that "Wigmore's commanding role in the field of evidence has tended
to eclipse the substantial character of his part in the development of the law of
torts").
33. See, e.g., 3 WiGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1766, at 770 (stating that
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ship between the adversarial cross-examination function and the hearsay
rule.34 Where he did refer to a "truth of the matter asserted" formulation,
it was clear that he was using it more as a rule of thumb than as an exhaus-
tive definition. 35 He stated his view of hearsay in a variety of ways, but his
essential point was that it consisted of out-of-court assertions.3 6
The solidification of the "truth of the matter asserted" language as the
definition and ultimate test of hearsay would more properly be traced not
to Wigmore, but to the American Law Institute's (ALI) Model Code of
Evidence. 37 There were, of course, previous instances of the use of this or
similar formulations not only by Wigmore, but also by other scholars. 38
Nonetheless, the ALI's formulation set the modern standard. Perhaps
then, we should attribute the credit and blame, if any, for the "truth of the
matter asserted" definition more to the ALI and Professor Morgan, the
principal reporter for the Model Code of Evidence, than to Dean
Wigmore.
39
34. See id. § 1362, at 3 (noting that fundamental test in hearsay examination is
test of cross examination and stating that hearsay rule is "rule rejecting assertions
... which have not been in some way subjected to... test of [c] ross-examination").
35. See id. § 1361, at 3 (stating that hearsay statement is inadmissible because
it was made under circumstances that do not subject it to certain "tests or investiga-
tions calculated to demonstrate its real value"). When Wigmore identified the type
of assertions prohibited by the hearsay rule, he uniformly made this characteriza-
tion based upon whether the statement was offered to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted. See id. ("The [h]earsay rule predicates a contrast between assertions
untested and assertions tested; it insists upon having the latter."). Hearsay, to Wig-
more, was "an Extra-judicial Testimonial Assertion." Id. § 1361, at 2 (explaining
that hearsay rule prohibits "extra-judicial testimonial assertions" and providing ex-
ample in which witness attempts to prove that event occurred by stating that third
person told him or her of event).
36. See id. § 1364, at 9 ("Under the name of the [h]earsay rule ... will here be
understood that rule which prohibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent
to testimony to the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on
the stand, where he may be probed and cross examined ....").
37. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 501(2) (1942) (defining hearsay state-
ment as "statement of which evidence is offered as tending to prove the truth of the
matter intended to be asserted') (emphasis added).
38. See A.I. McCormick, Hearsay, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE 442, 443
(Edgar W. Camp &John F. Crowe eds., 1905). McCormick defined hearsay in the
following manner:
Hearsay may be defined to be any statement, verbal or written, the per-
suasiveness or probative value of which depends partly or wholly upon
something other than the credit to be given to the witness who utters the
statement or the instrument which contains it, and renders necessary a
resort to and belief in the veracity and competency of some other person.
Id. Competency includes the perception, recollection and ability to relate. See Ed-
mund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 185-88 (1948) [hereinafter Hearsay Dangers] (discussing hearsay
dangers of sincerity, misuse of language, vocabulary, memory and perception).
39. See Edmund Morgan, Foreward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 47 (1942)
(stating that Model Code widely departs from common law in hearsay arena and
classifying hearsay using "truth of the matter asserted" concept).
[Vol. 43: p. 529
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Dean Wigmore did not totally approve of the ALl Model Code. 40 In
refusing to endorse it, he primarily cited drafting concerns, but he also
opposed its positions, which he thought were exceedingly radical and im-
practical. 4 1  Fundamentally, Wigmore opposed prematurely freezing
American hearsay common law into a fixed method or system of analy-
sis. 4 2 Unfortunately, Wigmore's syntheses of common law decisions in his
multi-volume treatises lacked the ease of use of the apparently simple set
of rules proposed by the ALI, the Uniform Code of Evidence and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.4" In spite of Wigmore's dissent, Morgan's ap-
proach has prevailed.
In 1948, Professor Morgan stated that the Model Code is "in no way
inconsistent with Wigmore's statement that the hearsay rule 'forbids the
use of an assertion, made out of court, as testimony of the truth of the fact
asserted." 44 This statement, and the related footnote containing equivo-
cal citation, had both the purpose and effect, copied by others, of invoking
the prestigious Wigmorian name. 45 The suggestion was that Wigmore ap-
proved the exclusive use of the "truth of the matter asserted" definition as
complete and sufficient.46
To summarize, the attribution of the Federal Rules of Evidence defi-
nition of hearsay to Wigmore is not completely accurate. In his treatises,
Wigmore focused more on the need to cross examine testimonial asser-
tions as the essential nature of hearsay.47 Further, he opposed the codifi-
40. SeeJohn H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A
Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J. 23, 28 (1942) (criticizing American Law Institute's (ALI's)
Model Code).
41. See id. at 23-28 (examining ALI's Code of Evidence with respect to six
"Postulates of method and style" and finding it unacceptable).
42. See RoALWE, supra note 30, at 226 (expressing disgust with "untested and
premature juristic analysis and method" and, for this reason, calling proposed
Corpus Juris "a calamity").
43. See, e.g., 5 WicMoRE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 1361-65, at 2-27.
44. Hearsay Dangers, supra note 38, at 216 (quoting 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 2, § 1746, at 134). Professor Morgan did not attempt to dissect recollec-
tion of past events from other forms of memory. See id. at 218 (pointing to risks of
hearsay, such as "insincerity and faulty narration, memory, and perception," rather
than formula "assertions offered for the truth of the matter asserted" as basis for
hearsay classification).
45. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Theory of Evidential Admissibility-Statements Made
Out of Court, 2 ARK. L. REV. 26, 26 n.1 (1947) (citing Wigmore as authority for
defining two reasons for hearsay rule).
46. See Hearsay Dangers, supra note 38, at 215-16 (providing Model Code defi-
nition of hearsay and stating that although Wigmore did not define assertion, word
must include nonverbal conduct and speech "offered as evidence of the truth of
the matter intended, or assumed by the proponent to have been intended, to be
communicated"). Professor Morgan further stated that Wigmore seemed to be-
lieve that the hearsay rule was inapplicable when the statement in question was not
used to assert the fact provided in the statement. See id. (analyzing Wigmore's view
of hearsay in relation to Model Code approach).
47. See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 7 (viewing cross ex-
amination as "essential and real test required by... [hearsay] rule"); see also Hear-
1998]
9
Ireland: Deconstructing Hearsay's Structure: Toward a Witness Recollection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
cation of evidence law into simple rules that might obfuscate underlying
themes and petrify further analytical development.48 This is not to say
that Wigmore's work did not contribute to the ultimate formulation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, including the definition of hearsay that the
Rules contain.49 The particular definition of hearsay, however, as "out-of-
court statements offered for the truth of the matter" to the practical exclu-
sion of a different test, "testimonial assertions that should be subject to
cross examination," belongs not to Wigmore, but to Morgan. 50
Although Professor Morgan was certainly one of the most influential
scholars in the field of evidence law, he was not as revered as Wigmore. 5 1
In invoking the Wigmore name, the definition gained more prestige than
Morgan's name could command. The effect was a result that Wigmore
had feared; with truth as the standard, hearsay analysis thereafter pro-
ceeded only in one path, the path of truth. 52 With "truth" as the standard,
lawyers and scholars placed very little focus on the witnessing function and
on the need to distinguish between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements.
53
One area of hearsay law on which both Wigmore and Morgan agreed
illustrates the difference between Wigmore's approach to hearsay and the
say Dangers, supra note 38, at 188 (concluding that cross examination is most
effective in exposing faults in perception and memory); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Per-
ception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22 (1970) (stating that right to cross examine is
"of the greatest importance to the integrity of the factfinding process and is the
keystone of both the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation").
48. See RoALFE, supra note 30, at 227 (stating that tension existed between
Wigmore's view in favor of specific attention to current rules of evidence and Mor-
gan's view in favor of more general statements of rules).
49. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) advisory committee's note (stating that definition
of hearsay "follows along familiar lines in including only statements offered to
prove . . . truth of ... matter asserted" and citing Wigmore as authority).
50. 5 WIGMoRE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 1361-62, at 2-7 (stressing impor-
tance of cross examination in judicial process). Current scholarship agrees with
Wigmore's position that cross examination is the essence of hearsay. See Wheaton,
supra note 3, at 221 ("It is only by the use of cross examination that the various
defects of testimony can be exposed."); see also RIcE, supra note 27, at 233 (noting
that courts at common law have wrongly strayed from "straight and narrow path"
of classic hearsay definition's logic); Mueller, supra note 12, at 381-82 (identifying
conventional argument against hearsay as lack of cross examination).
51. See Michael Ariens, A Short History of Hearsay Reform, With Particular Refer-
ence to Hoffman v. Palmer, Eddie Morgan and Jerry Frank, 28 IND. L. REV. 183, 191
(1995) (stating that Morgan's "reputation in the field of evidence was second only
to Wigmore's").
52. See FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure ... that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
53. But see MASON LADD & RONALD L. CARLSON, CASES & MATERIALS ON EVI-
DENCE 803 (1972) (beginning its inquiry as to meaning of hearsay with importance
of cross examination and witnessing function, rather than with "truth of the mat-
ter" formulation).
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approach of the Federal Rules.54 Wigmore did not view prior statements
of witnesses as hearsay.55 Under the Federal Rules, prior statements by
witnesses are hearsay except for some inconsistent statements that the
Rules specifically exempt.5 6 This difference illustrates a stark philosophi-
cal difference. Under the Federal Rules, truth is the ultimate test of hear-
say.5 7 Wigmore saw hearsay not as a direct test of truth, but as a means of
promoting confrontation through cross examination. 58 Prior statements
of a witness do not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution
because the Federal Rules preserve the opportunity to cross examine the
witness.59 This is sufficient, under the Wigmore approach, to take such
54. Compare 3 WIGMOIR ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 687 (arguing
that prior statements should be admissible because they are "not primarily hear-
say") (emphasis omitted), with Hearsay Dangers, supra note 38, at 192 (stating that
prior statements, while hearsay, should be admissible because they do not involve
any hearsay risks). For a brief, useful review of the history of the admissibility of
prior statements of witnesses, comparing common law, Wigmore and the Federal
Rules approaches, see Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent State-
ments and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 509, 511-21 (1997).
55. See 3 WiGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 687 (finding that
prior statement is not "primarily hearsay, because it is not offered assertively, i.e. not
testimonially"). According to Wigmore, the hearsay rule excludes only out-of-
court statements that a party attempts to use as credible testimony. See id. Prior
statements, however, are not to be relied upon. See id. "It follows, therefore, that
the use of Prior Self-Contradictions to discredit is not obnoxious to the Hearsay
Rule." Id.
56. See FED. R. EVIn. 801(d) (1) (ruling that under certain specified condi-
tions, prior statements are not hearsay). According to Rule 801(d) (1), a prior
statement is not hearsay only if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross exami-
nation concerning the statement, and if the statement is (A) inconsistent
with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury ... or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identi-
fication of a person made after perceiving the person ....
Id.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) (defining hearsay as out-of-court statement "of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted") (emphasis added).
58. See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 3 (explaining theory
and purpose of hearsay rule). Wigmore argued that the hearsay rule involved two
elements, cross examination and confrontation, with cross examination as the es-
sential element. See id. (stating that cross examination is "indispensible feature,"
while confrontation is "subordinate and dispensible"). The underlying theory of
the hearsay rule from Wigmore's perspective was that, "as accepted in our law, [the
hearsay rule] signifies a rule rejecting assertions, offered testimonially, which have not been
in some way subjected to the test of [c]ross examination." Id.
59. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970) (holding that Confronta-
tion Clause does not require exclusion of prior statements by witness). The
Supreme Court noted that the Confrontation Clause: 1) forces the witness to tes-
tify under oath; 2) allows cross examination of the witness; and 3) permits the jury
to judge the demeanor of the witness. See id. at 158. Although the Supreme Court
acknowledged that a prior statement may or may not have been subject to the
three protections of the Confrontation Clause, the Court ruled that "if the declar-
ant is present and testifying at trial, the out-of-court statement for all practical pur-
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statements out of the operation of the hearsay rule.60 Such statements are
hearsay under the Federal Rules because of its rigid adherence to a truth
standard rather than a cross-examination standard.
61
B. Hearsay and Its Exceptions as Legal Science
What we can undoubtedly attribute to Wigmore is the structure of
modern evidence law, including the hearsay rule.6 2 His great treatise or-
ganized and categorized the rule into what has evolved into its modern
form. 63 Before Wigmore, courts had focused on admissibility, not on de-
termining a structure for making that determination.
64
The analytic structure of the modern hearsay rule, its exclusions and
its exceptions derive directly from the analytic approach of Wigmore.
65
poses regains most of the lost protections." Id. As far as the first protection is
concerned, the witness will be made to affirm or deny the prior statement under
oath. See id. at 158-59. At the later proceedings, the witness will also face, albeit
belatedly, cross examination, satisfying the second protection of the Confrontation
Clause. See id. at 159. Finally, the third protection is satisfied in that the jury will
be able to judge the witness's demeanor. See id. at 160.
60. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 687 (determining
that prior statements are not "primarily hearsay").
61. See FED. R. EID. 801 (d)(1) (stating that prior statement that does not fall
within narrowly tailored exception was hearsay). The Appendix of suggested revi-
sions to the Federal Rules retains a modified form of Rule 801 (d) (1). While this
may constitute a philosophical compromise of the basic premise of the proposed
revisions, it was thought necessary to retain the Federal Rules formulation regard-
ing prior statements of a witness to avoid a substantive change in the admissibility
of evidence. The goal of the proposed revisions contained in the Appendix is not
ideological purity, but the creation of a simpler hearsay analysis with minimal im-
pact on evidentiary admissibility. In the author's view, there is no reason not to
expand the operation of Rule 801(d) (1) to include all prior inconsistent state-
ments, which is consistent with the Wigmore view.
62. See Thomas J; Reed, Evidentiary Failures: A Structural Theory of Evidence Ap-
plied to Hearsay Issues, 18 AM.J. TRIAL ADvoc. 353, 360 (1994) (discussing structure
of rules of evidence and concluding, "A brief examination of the Federal Rules of
Evidence confirms the impression that Wigmore's structural model provided the
basis for the Federal Rules"). Wigmore attempted to give some structure to the
study of evidence by using "an elaborate evidentiary taxonomy using very precise
definitions." Id. at 357. Professor Morgan, when drafting the 1942 Model Rules of
Evidence, followed the general structure of Wigmore's treatise. See id. at 359-60.
The Federal Rules of Evidence followed the format of, and are structurally similar
to, the original 1942 Model Rules. See id. at 360. "In short, contemporary Ameri-
can evidence law has been shaped by Wigmore's original taxonomy." Id. at 361.
63. See Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1341, 1346 n.17 (1987) (noting that Wigmore's use of categorical exceptions to
hearsay rule aided rise and acceptance of categorical approach to modern hearsay
rule); see also 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1420, at 202-03 (identifying
categories of statements in which there is no need for cross examination).
64. See PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF, supra note 1, at 3 (distinguishing be-
tween "Admissibility" and "Proof"). Wigmore believed that the major problem
with the law of evidence was that it had focused too intensely on "Admissibility"
while virtually ignoring "Proof." See id.
65. Compare 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1420, at 202-03 (recog-
nizing categories of statements that are exceptions to hearsay rule), with FED. R.
[Vol. 43: p. 529
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Wigmore attempted to make the law of hearsay into a science in an era
when academics venerated science as an absolute, rather than a relative
rational enterprise. 66 Borrowing from the precellular science of gross
morphology, legal scholars like Wigmore and Morgan dissected, organized
and cataloged the law of hearsay into a model of scientific legalism. 67 The
under-inclusive hearsay definition was inadvertently advantageous in this
endeavor in that it produced a large number of exceptions that, like the
myriad of species in the natural world, scholars could further refine in a
scientific classification system.
68
Wigmore saw himself as a legal scientist and the law of evidence as the
science of proof.69 As a man of his time, and a product of the Harvard
School of Law during the Langdell period, he saw science as the road of
reasoned enlightenment. 70 The science of Wigmore's era was a science of
observation and classification in which the whole was the sum of its
EVIn. 803 (listing exceptions to hearsay rule when declarant is available as witness),
and FED. R. EvID. 804 (listing categorical exceptions to hearsay rule when declarant
is not available as witness).
66. SeeJoseph Mazzarella, The Scientific Method of Generalizing from Data of Legal
Evolution (John H. Wigmore trans.), in FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOP-
MENT 77, 79 (Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds., 1918) (comparing law to
science). Wigmore created a science called the Science of Comparative Law and
identified the purpose of this science as the "discovery of the general process of
development of jural ideas and institutions." Id.
67. See id. at 80-82 (stating aim of morphology as reconstructing jural system
of certain group of people and outlining general concepts of morphology). Mor-
phology is a point of view from which academics study part of Wigmore's Science
of Comparative Law. See id. at 79 (noting that academics study jural system from
five points of view: its morphology, stratigraphy, genealogy, psychology and
philosophy).
68. See generally FED. R. EvIo. 803-804 (containing total of 29 exceptions to
general rule that hearsay statements are inadmissible). For example, the current
Federal Rules of Evidence are grouped into sections depending upon whether the
declarant is unavailable to be a witness. See FED. R. EVID. 804 (requiring declarant
to be unavailable); see also FED. R. EV. 803 (allowing use of certain exceptions
regardless of whether declarant is available to be witness).
69. See generally JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OFJUDICIAL PROOF 3-6 (3d
ed. 1937) [hereinafter SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF] ("This book aspires to offer a
'novum organum' for the study of Judicial Evidence."). The science of evidence,
according to Wigmore, consisted of two parts, "Proof" and "Admissibility." Id.
"Proof" involved the process of "contentious persuasion" or, in other words, a law-
yer's attempts "to move the mind of the tribunal." Id. "Admissibility" consisted of
procedural rules that attempted to shield the tribunal against "erroneous persua-
sion." Id.
70. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdel's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prr. L. REv. 1, 31 (1983)
(explaining reliance that Langell and his followers placed on importance of sci-
ence). Langdell believed that the best way for the common law to progress was
through legal science. See id. at 5 ("The heart of the theory was the view that law is
science. Langdell believed that through scientific methods lawyers could derive
legal judgments from a few fundamental principles and concepts, which it was the
task of the scholar-scientist like himself to discover."). Once the scholar-scientist
discovered the fundamental, previously unrecognized principle, it would lead to
judicial decisions that were more enlightened than older decisions because they
were based on a scientific model. See id. at 31 (noting that articulating unrecog-
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parts. 7 1 The scientific model of the day was neither the chaos of Quarks
nor the relativity of Einstein; rather, it was the classification of nature. 7
2
nized principle is "act of discovery, not one of illegitimate legislation"). Thus,
these new decisions "would contribute to the progress of the law." Id.
The extent of his dedication to the view that law was science can be seen most
clearly in a brief article that he wrote just before his death. SeeJohn Henry Wig-
more, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERI-
CAN SCHOLARS 313 (Julius Rosenthal Found. ed., 1941) (discussing Wigmore's
philosophy regarding Science of Law). In this article, Wigmore undertakes to
classify the Science of Law, which he terms Nomo-logy. See id. at 315. According to
Wigmore's philosophy, the Science of Law "may be classified according to the dif-
ferent activities of thought which deal with a concept of law." Id. Wigmore believed that
four activities composed the concept of law: (1) Nomo-scopics, "[a] thing to be as-
certained as a fact of human conduct"; (2) Nomo-sophics, "[a] thing to be questioned
and debated"; (3) Nomo-didactics, "[a] thing to be taught as a subject of education";
and (4) Nomo-practics, "[a] thing to be made and enforced by the State organs." Id. at
315-16. Wigmore explained that each concept was meant to cover a distinct philos-
ophy about law. See id. at 320.
There were, however, necessary instances in which the concepts overlapped.
See id. Wigmore explained this as a necessary result of the nature of law, "because
Law deals with conduct, and with our thought about conduct, and our thought of
Law is and must be often passing from one aspect to the other, or dealing with
several at once." Id. at 320-21. Nomo-logy and its branches and sub-branches
never quite caught on, but the science of law did, enshrined in the structure of
modern day hearsay analysis. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (using categorical approach to
establish exceptions to hearsay rule); see also FED. R. EVID. 804 (same); cf John
Henry Wigmore, Introduction to ALBERT KocoUREK, JURAL RELATIONS xxi, xxi-xxii
(2d ed. 1928) [hereinafter Introduction JuRAL RELATIONS]. Wigmore, in his intro-
duction toJURAL REtATIONS, noted that his manuscript, which attempted to classify
legal ideas, was left "in a discarded bundle" because there was "no professional
interest in progress in that field." Id.
71. See Introduction JURAL RELATIONS, supra note 70, at xxi-xxii. Wigmore ex-
plained that his philosophy of science consisted of two parts. See id. at xxi. The
first part was observation, or as Wigmore described it, "a realistic analysis of all the
specific data in a given body of knowledge." Id. The second part consisted of
classification, i.e., "a synthesis of those ideas in a consistent terminology." Id. Wig-
more felt that classification was necessary to handle ideas and further the progress
of science. See id. The law, however, had lacked the terminology needed for its
progression as a science. See id.
72. See generally ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 188
(1982) (discussing increasing use of biological classification in nineteenth cen-
tury). Scientists used classification for hundreds of years prior to the nineteenth
century, but the use of biological classification did not flourish until technological
advances, such as the invention of the microscope, arose. See id. at 185-88. The
use of classification exploded with the increased use of microscopical studies after
the 1820s. See id. at 189.
This is best illustrated by analogy to the science of biology. At the turn of the
twentieth century, biology was a science of classification of species into kingdoms,
phyla and groups. See HERBERT H. Ross, BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMATICS 5 (1974) (stating
that by end of nineteenth century, systematics had not yet gained widespread sup-
port). Classification is one of the major concerns of systematics. See id. at 10 ("Be-
cause of its usefulness as a storage-and-retrieval mechanism for biological
information, classification is the third chief concern of systematics."). "Classifica-
tion is the ordering of organisms into taxa on the basis of their similarity and
relationship as determined by or inferred from their taxanomic characters." MAYR,
supra, at 185 (italics omitted). Scientists collected specimens from all over the
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This is the model on which hearsay analysis rests today.73
world to advance the knowledge of the science of "life." See URL LANHAM, ORIGINS
OF MODERN BIOLOGY 126-27 (1968) (discussing rise of scientific exploration).
Prior to the nineteenth century, animal and plant specimens had only been col-
lected as a kind of "sideline to ... commercial activities." Id. at 127. Systemics,
however, created a greater need for specimens. See id. at 126 (noting that geo-
graphic exploration was necessary to map organic diversity). During the eight-
eenth century, scientists began to carry out geographic exploration for specimens
in a "well-organized fashion." Id. What followed was "an era of strictly scientific
explorations that were to make known at least the general outlines of the diversity
of living things." Id. at 127. All too often, the cost of scientific "collection" and
"preservation" consisted of shooting the last few specimens of a species so that
museums could display them as exhibits. Cf. id. at 128 (quoting remarks of one
scientific explorer, "[T]he main object of all my journeys was to obtain specimens
of natural history, both for my private collection and [to] supply duplicates to
museums and amateurs").
Scientists had not even dreamed of the molecular biology of deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) and ribonucleaic acid (RNA). Similarly, cellular biology was in its in-
fancy. There were no clones, not even in theory. See Cloning: A History, SCIENCE
WORLD, May 2, 1997, at 7-10, available in 1997 WL 9586614 (discussing how cloning
evolved). A German embryologist first theorized cloning in 1938. See id. The em-
bryologist believed that scientists could clone animals by fusing an embryo and an
egg cell. See id. The first attempt at cloning was in 1952, when two scientists at-
tempted to clone frogs. See id. Cloning attempts were largely unsuccessful until
1984, when an embryologist from Denmark cloned sheep from early-stage embryo
cells. See id. The first successful cloning of an adult mammal occurred in 1997,
when Scottish embryologist Ian Wilmut cloned a baby lamb from an adult sheep's
udder cell. See id. Only the Frankenstein monster demonstrated the dream, or
nightmare, of life born in the science laboratory. See MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKEN-
STEIN 52 (M. K. Joseph ed., 1969) ("I succeeded in discovering the cause of genera-
tion and life; nay, more, I became myself capable of bestowing animation upon
lifeless matter."). Shelley's original work, which was first published in 1818, was
subtitled "The Modern Prometheus." See M.K. Joseph, Introduction to SHELLEY,
supra, vii, vii. One of the main parts of the myth of Prometheus is the story of
Prometheus plasticator, who in certain versions of the myth was said to have "cre-
ated or recreated mankind by animating a figure made of clay." Id. at viii. This
scientifically created life could be built, in theory, like a machine, by grafting to-
gether the constituent bodily organs into which scientists could dissect a corpse.
See generally SHELLEY, supra, at 53-56 (telling story of creation of human being with
materials from "dissecting room and slaughter-house").
73. See Chris Blair, Let's Say Good-bye to Res gestae, 33 TULSA L.J. 349, 352 (1997)
(discussing classification of exceptions to hearsay rule); James Donald Moorehead,
Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res gestae Reliability, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
203, 205 (1995) (noting that exceptions once commonly known as res gestae are
now codified into specific categories); Paul R. Rice, Introduction to The Evidence
Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence with Supporting Commentary,
171 F.R.D. 330, 361-70 (1997) (discussing proposed revisions to classification of
exceptions to rule prohibiting hearsay).
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We have organized, classified and cataloged the law of hearsay.7 4 We
have dissected and described its constituent parts.75 Like Ptolemy's epicy-
cle theory of the movement of heavenly bodies, the law of hearsay works in
that you can get the right answer to any question of admissibility, but you
cannot get there directly.76 This seems to be an obvious failure. Never-
theless, only a few decades ago the "ganglia" structure of hearsay analysis
likely seemed scientific and therefore right.77 That we failed to capture
hearsay's life essence and that it lacked the unifying structure of a com-
mon DNA did not matter.78
C. Conflated Truth
Just as a convoluted structure of rules and "scientifically" classified
exceptions seemed intuitively right, so did a definition that focused on
74. See Blair, supra note 73, at 352 ("[A] ny analysis of the admissibility of spon-
taneous statements should proceed under the more precise hearsay exceptions
now recognized ...."); Moorehead, supra note 73, at 239 n.184 ("The exceptions
to the hearsay rule are officially grouped into two classifications: those exceptions
where the declarant is unavailable and those where the declarant's unavailability is
immaterial."); Rice, supra note 73, at 362 (noting justifications for classifying hear-
say exceptions); A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Admissibility, as Res Gestae, of State-
ments Relating to Origin or Cause of or Responsibility for, Fire, 13 A.L.R.3d 1114, 1121-
31 (1968) (attempting to classify court decisions holding that exclamations relat-
ing to origin of fire are admissible under exceptions to hearsay rule).
75. See Rice, supra note 73, at 369 (proposing amended rule of evidence con-
taining new class of hearsay exceptions); see also Glen Weissenberger, Reconstructing
the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 1525, 1534-42 (1996) (discussing evolu-
tion of hearsay rule and its exceptions).
76. See generally Claudius Ptolemaeus (last modified Nov. 8, 1996) <http://ptol-
emy.berkeley.edu/People/ptolemy.html> (providing brief description of Ptolemy
and his works). Ptolemy, a Greek astronomer during the Second Century A.D.,
"codified the geocentric view of the universe, and rationalized the apparent retro-
grade motion of the planets using epicycles." Id. Until Copernicus proposed the
heliocentric theory in 1543, the Ptolemaic system remained "the accepted wis-
dom." Id.
77. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J. concur-
ring) (discussing "ganglia of hearsay rules and their exceptions" and its relation to
Confrontation Clause of Sixth Amendment); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
62 (1980) (calling exceptions to hearsay rule "'an old-fashioned crazy quilt made
of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists"'
(quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937))).
78. See Cassidy v. Maryland, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)
("Although subject to multitudinous exceptions, the [Hearsay] Rule, in its essence,
is a rule of exclusion."); see also California v. Taylor, 331 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958) ("[T]he very essence of the hearsay rule is a requirement that the
veracity of the witness and his testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of
cross examination under oath." (citing Buchanan v. Nye, 275 P.2d 767, 770 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1954))); MICHAEL H. GRA-IAm, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6713 n.2, at 124 (interim ed. 1997) (noting that reliability of witness's
statement "goes to the very essence of the present sense impression hearsay
exception").
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truth. 79 Truth has many meanings, each of which is positive and relevant
to a legal factfinding process.80 Accuracy, veracity and justice are all possi-
ble meanings of truth.8 1 The law is all about the search for truth and
justice. In one meaning, the word truth encompasses not only factual ac-
curacy and veracity, but all of the aims ofjustice.82 One academic suggests
that truth is a mystical concept, related to justice.83 All societies value
truth highly and associate it with all things good and right.84 Therein lies
79. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note ("The definition [of
hearsay] follows along familiar lines in including only statements offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.").
80. Compare BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1515 (6th ed. 1990) ("There are three
conceptions as to what constitutes truth: agreement of thought and reality; even-
tual verification; and consistency of thought with itself."), with THE AMERICAN HEI-
TAGE DICTIONARY 1300 (2d ed. 1982) (defining truth as "1. Conformity to fact or
actuality. 2. Fidelity to an original or standard. 3. Reality; actuality. 4. A statement
proven to be or accepted as true. 5. Sincerity; integrity").
81. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1269 (10th ed. 1996).
Truth may mean "sincerity in action, character, and utterance" or it may mean "a
transcendent fundamental or spiritual reality." Id. Moreover, it may indicate "the
property of being in accord with fact or reality" or "fidelity to an original or to a
standard." Id.
82. See MvLES DILLON, CELT & HINDU 16-18 (Osborne Bergin Memorial Lec-
ture III, 1973) [hereinafter CELT & HINDU] (discussing significance of truth in
Celtic and Hindu cultures).
83. See MYLES DILLON, CELTS & ARYANS: SURVIVALS OF INDO-EUROPEAN SPEECH
AND SOCIETY 86-90 (1975) [hereinafter CELTS & ARYANS] (noting that justice is
highest virtue to Indo-European societies); see also CELT & HINDU, supra note 82, at
16 (noting importance of truth in Indian religion and literature). During the Ve-
dic period in India, "Truth was the highest power, the ultimate cause of all being."
Id. Truth was also viewed as "a power which controls and sustains the created
world." Id. Indian literature contains numerous stories in which a statement of
truth allowed one to work a miracle. See id. (describing story in which woman was
saved from death by speaking truth). Celtic culture also viewed truth as "the high-
est principle and the sustaining power of creation . . . ." Id. at 16-17. A Celtic
poem instructed a prince to guard the truth, "[flor it is through the ruler's truth
that great tribes are governed." Id. at 17. Ancient Greek culture also viewed truth
as the "supreme power." Id. at 18 (expressing notions of truth through writings of
Stoics, Stoic Platonists and Platonist Stoics).
Commenting on mythic Celtic Law, for example, Dillon reports a case judged
by King Lugaid Mac Con, who was overthrown by Cormac due to Mac Con's "false"
judgement in a matter involving some trespassing sheep. See id. at 17. Dillon re-
counts the story by writing:
Many of you will know the story of the child Cormac at Tara, who heard
the king, Lugaid Mac Con, give a false judgement, when he awarded the
sheep who had trespassed on the queen's garden as forfeit for their tres-
pass. At once the courthouse began to fall and slide down-hill. Cormac
said: "No! That is false judgement. The woad will grow again in the
garden. Only the sheep's wool, which will also grow again, is forfeit for
the woad!" And all the people cried out: "This is the Truth". At once the
courthouse was stayed in its fall. Lugaid Mac Con had to leave Tara, and
Cormac later became king.
Id.
84. See Milner S. Ball, Wrong Experiment, Wrong Result: An Appreciatively Critical
Response to Schwartz, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 569 (1983) (noting that an-
other scholar "nominates truth ascertainment as the paramount goal of civil litiga-
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its problem as a standard and test. It is both lacking in precision and
evocative of an archetypal mystical belief in the power of the spoken word
when used for good.
Trial courts concern themselves daily with three very different mean-
ings of truth that are not necessarily compatible: veracity, accuracy and a
just (or true) verdict. Veracity means truth in the sense of sincerity or
honesty.8 5 Accuracy means factual correctness and is as objective as verac-
ity is subjective.8 6 A third meaning of truth is a just outcome, or a true
verdict, from a factfinding process in which every person is truthful and all
facts are completely disclosed.8 7 In an imperfect world, however, these
three related ideal concepts may not be congruent. Although triers of fact
never have all the facts accurately before them, they may yet reach a just
result, with or without reliance on perjured witness statements.88 The
contrary is, unfortunately, also true. Honest testimony, based on sincere
belief, can lead to an unjust result because factual accuracy and veracity
tion and therefore as the ruling concern for the behavior and accountability of
advocates"); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 543, 553 (1983) (stating that ascertainment of truth is paramount goal of
judicial system and that all rules should be constructed with that goal in mind).
85. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 801.0, at 700-02 (discussing importance
of ensuring witness's credibility); 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1049, at
6-7 (discussing use of inconsistent statements to impeach witness's credibility).
Synonyms or near synonyms for truth in the subjective honesty sense include verac-
ity, credit or credibility, and sincerity.
86. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."). Grammatically, "truth of the matter"
seems to refer to the factual accuracy of a matter rather than veracity, because
matters can hardly be honest. But see Rice, supra note 73, at 526 (noting that Advi-
sory Committee decided to exclude hearsay as evidence because "the four dangers
associated with testimonial evidence (memory, perception, sincerity, and ambigu-
ity in narration) cannot be explored when the testimony regards an out-of-court
statement").
87. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (stating that "the very na-
ture of a trial [is] a search for truth"); Schwartz, supra note 84, at 553 (stating that
goal of trial is "arriving at as accurate a reconstruction of the past event as is
possible").
88. Cf Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches: The Constitutionality of Restricting
Witness Speech, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 291, 303-04 (1996) (discussing safeguards that may
prevent judgments based on perjured testimony).
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are not synonymous. 89 Memory is a complex process that often draws,
unconsciously, on imagination. 90 An honest truth may not be true at all.9 1
A witness can be telling the truth, in the sense of being honest and
sincere, and yet not be telling the truth, in the sense of accuracy. 92 An
error can occur, causing a witness to tell a false truth, either during acqui-
sition of information through perception or during the complex and se-
lective process of remembering and retrieving memory.9 3 The reverse is
also possible.
A lie can be the truth. That is, a witness can lie, yet accurately portray
what actually happened. This is not to suggest that perjury is honorable or
tolerable, or that judgments based on such testimony should stand.9 4
Judgments based on perjured testimony, however, have not necessarily
failed to find objective truth, just as judgments based on the testimony of
totally honest witnesses can convict persons who are in fact innocent of
any wrongdoing.
9 5
89. See generally ELIZABETH F. LoF-rus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTI-
MONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 9-10 (3d ed. 1997) (providing examples that illuminate
distinction between factual accuracy and witness veracity).
90. See id. at 10 (describing "complex" processes of memory and perception).
The authors explain that people do not simply record important events like a
videotape recorder, rather the memory process is divided into three major stages.
See id. (explaining three stages as: acquisition, where witness perceives event, re-
tention, where witness stores information about event in memory; and retrieval,
where witness tries to recall stored information).
91. See Dillard S. Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL
L.Q. 391, 391 (1933) ("The vast majority of testimonial errors ... are those of the
average, normal honest man, errors unknown to the witness and wholly uninten-
tional, represented in the great body of testimony which is subjectively accurate but
objectively false.").
92. See Lorrus & DOYLE, supra note 89, at 10 (discussing how eyewitness of
aircraft accident honestly believed plane crashed vertically while photographic evi-
dence showed plane crashed horizontally).
93. See Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concern-
ing the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. PITT. L.
REv. 547, 550-56 (1984) (stating that distortion may occur during "initial percep-
tion of relevant information (acquisition), storage of that information in memory
(retention), and subsequent recitation based on the stored information (re-
trieval)"); see also Monica L. Hayes, The Necessity of Memory Experts for the Defense in
Prosecutions for Child Sexual Abuse Based Upon Repressed Memories, 32 AM. CRiM. L. REv.
69, 75 (1994) ("The retrieval environment and patient expectations during the
retrieval process have been shown to play a large role in false memory creation.");
Tillers & Schum, supra note 29, at 817 ("The view that human beings make deci-
sions about what to say and believe and that their expectations and interests influ-
ence their beliefs is now supported by a large body of non-legal scholarship.").
94. See Angel Saad, Perjury, 34 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 857, 879 (1997) (discussing
increased penalties under United States Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction of
justice that leads to "'indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based
upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence"' (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.3 commentary (1995))).
95. See FeliceJ. Levine &June Louin Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identifica-
tion: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079, 1081-82 (1973) (stating
that inaccurate, but sincere, identification of criminals in lineups is major source
1998]
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Which truth is it that hearsay seeks to confine to in-court state-
ments-veracity or accuracy? In seeking to exclude out-of-court true state-
ments, is the purpose and effect to exclude lies or errors? Both definitions
of truth are essential to the witnessing process, and scholars often conflate
the meaning of truth in the hearsay definition, using both accuracy and
veracity as an explanation and justification for the rule.9 6
If the hearsay rule is a rule of accuracy, it does not seem to effectuate
its purpose. Hearsay is perhaps better seen as a rule of veracity, its pur-
pose being to prohibit testimony that may consist of lies untested by cross
examination. 97 If there is to be a lie, let it be in open court. It is a cynical,
yet true, statement. For a judgment to be based on a lie, the hearsay rule
requires that the lie take place in court.98 The ancient "oath helpers,"
precursor to the modern jury, consisted of twelve "witnesses" who would
swear generally to the defendant's innocence. 99 The court did not re-
of faulty convictions); Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the
Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REv. 93, 99 n.42-43 (1992) (listing
numerous authorities on unreliability of eyewitness testimony). It has been said
that "[a] man does not lie to himself." Falknor, supra note 13, at 56. In fact, men
and women confabulate their own recollections to suit their own belief systems.
One does lie to one's self, particularly when recalling past events.
96. See Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You ": Implied Asser-
tions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REv. 783, 783 (1990)
(discussing assertion-centered and declarant-centered definitions of hearsay and
their effect on implied assertions). Scholars have tended to back into the ambigu-
ity in the word truth. Whether scholars view hearsay primarily as an accuracy or a
credibility rule underlies some of the controversy concerning an assertion-cen-
tered accuracy model or a declarant-centered credibility model. See id. at 784.
The Federal Rules of Evidence take an assertion-based approach, which re-
sults in a narrower definition of the rule's scope. Although there is some logic to
Professor Park's position, it is not possible to line up the scholarship in any neat
fashion. Compare GRAHAm, supra note 10, § 801.0, at 699-702 (discussing veracity of
witness), with Suggested Classification, supra note 25, at 230-31 (using truth to mean
factual accuracy).
97. See Lawrence Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958-61
(1974) (describing underlying purpose of hearsay rule). Tribe stated that:
[I]naccuracies [in testimony] are usually attributed to the four testimo-
nial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous
memory. In the absence of special reasons, the perceived untrustworthi-
ness of such an out-of-court act or utterance has lead the Anglo-Saxon
legal system to exclude it as hearsay despite its potenially probative value.
Id. at 958 (footnote omitted).
98. See id. Tribe noted that out-of-court statements have "long been regarded
as particularly suspect when the act or utterance is not one made in court, under
oath, by a person whose demeanor at the time is witnessed by the trier, and under
circumstances permitting immediate cross examination by counsel . . . to probe
possible inaccuracies in the inferential chain." Id. (footnote omitted).
99. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of
Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1993) (describing historical origins
ofjury system in "oath helpers" tradition); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges
Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 809, 816 n.30
(1997) (discussing use of "oath-helpers" as historical means to demonstrate
innocence).
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quire that the helpers have personal knowledge to testify because the fact
that the "witness" would stake his soul on the innocence of the accused
was sufficient indicia of innocence.' 0 0
If the sole objective and effect of the hearsay rule were to ensure that
only in-court and not out-of-court lies enter the record, our system should
probably abolish the hearsay rule.10 ' Along with abolishing the hearsay
rule, we should abolish other rules of incompetence, such as party inca-
pacity, as a relic of a more superstitious time which insisted that a judg-
ment be based on facts that, if not accurate, would at least lead to
damnation of the source.10 2 The modern justification of hearsay is not
oaths and threats of damnation, it is cross examination. 10 3 Truth, how-
ever defined, seems to be neither the purpose nor the effect of the hearsay
rule, because truth is not really what hearsay is all about.1 04 "Truth of the
matter" is a litmus test, but not a very good one for it sweeps too broadly,
necessitating an exhaustive list of exceptions to function properly.' 0 5
Something different from finding truth is going on when the entire
rule, both its definition and its exceptions, is taken as a whole. For exam-
ple, out-of-court lies respecting present or future events may be admissi-
ble, even from the mouths of obvious villains.10 6 What is not admissible,
with few exceptions, are out-of-court recollections that are reports of past
100. See Robert H. White, Origin and Development of Trial byJury, 29 TENN. L.
REV. 8, 11-13 (1961) (noting that one French queen had 300 noblemen and three
bishops swear that her four-month-old son was offspring of dead king, fact of
which witnesses could have very little personal knowledge).
101. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 10, at 774-76 (discussing this and other rea-
sons for abolishing hearsay rule); see also Christopher Finlayson, Proving Your
Case-Evidence and Procedure in Action, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 257, 299 (discussing
abolition of hearsay rule in other countries).
102. See Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IowA L. REV. 482, 490-91
(1939) (describing abolition of similar religiously motivated judicial rules).
103. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.3, at 1052-53 (explaining
principle that out-of-court statement is not subject to cross examination, and there-
fore lacks indicia of reliability).
104. See 3A WiCMoRE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 898, at 995 (stating that
when declarant is present at trial and available for cross examination "the whole
purpose of the hearsay rule has been already satisfied"). But cf. MICHAEL H. GRA-
HAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM's HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 801.1, at 504 (4th ed.
1984) (stating that one purpose of hearsay rule is to ascertain truth of statement).
105. See Karla-Dee Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children's
Rights to be Freefrom Child Sexual Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 214, 257 (1990)
(describing hearsay exceptions in certain areas as either too broad or too rigid); see
also FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24) and 804(a)-(b) (providing exhaustive list of hearsay
exceptions).
106. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence:
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1511 (1996) (stating that "opinions of
future events have been permitted under existing hearsay exceptions such as pres-
ent sense impression" which would, of course, also contemplate statements of pres-
ent events as well); see also FED. R. EvID. 803(1) (defining present sense impression
exception to hearsay rule).
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events recorded in witness memory, even if the declarant is a person
known to be of honest and accurate character.' 0
7
HYPOTHETICAL I
Suppose that Dan, a convicted perjurer and a gangster who hates the
police, telephones Will from his cellular phone. These facts can be inde-
pendently verified. Will wishes to testify that Dan said to him, "Sorry I'm
late calling, but I'm hiding in the back of my van. The place is swarming
with cops. They grabbed some bozo who looks kind of like me, wait 'til
they find they've got the wrong guy. They've got him in 'cuffs on the
street. Wait a minute. That cop is pulling his gun. Hey, he just shot the
guy. He was helpless on the ground." The issue is whether the shooting
was murder or justifiable force. The evidence is hearsay by definition, yet
it is admissible as present sense impression.1" 8 This unreliable evidence is
admissible, even though it may well be inaccurate or false.
HYPOTHETICAL II
A note found in a saintly nun's prayer book, clearly written by her on
or about Christmas past, reads, "Last October I saw a man fall from the top
of a train just south of Los Angeles. A woman jumped off after him. She
was obviously injured, but struggled until she dropped dead trying to help
him. I wish to pattern my own conduct after her." The state asserts that
the man pushed her and then jumped. The man, charged with murder,
cannot call the nun because she is dead, so defendant wants to use the
note in his defense. It is hearsay. There are no exceptions.10 9
107. See FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules .... ); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (describing limited exception to
admission of hearsay recollections where statement is almost concurrent with ob-
servation of event); FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (describing limited exception to admis-
sion of hearsay recollections where statement was made in excited state); FED. R.
EvID. 803(3) (describing limited exception to admission of hearsay recollections
where statement concerns then existing mental, emotional or physical condition);
FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (describing limited exception to admission of hearsay recol-
lections where statement was made pursuant to medical diagnosis).
108. See FED. R. EvID. 803(1). The Rule provides: "A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition [is admissible as a hearsay exception]." Id.
109. But see FED. R. EVID. 807 (providing catchall hearsay exception). The
Rule states:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded
by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is of-
fered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
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The difference in admissibility in these hypothetical cases has nothing
to do with truth. These examples also explain why scholars have not both-
ered to refine the meaning of truth as used in the hearsay definition. The
test of truth misses the mark. The note in Hypothetical II is a witness
statement relating past events; that is, it is out-of-court testimony. Oppos-
ing counsel does not have the opportunity to cross examine the witness
giving that testimony; therefore, it is not admissible. 110 The phone call in
Hypothetical I is of quite a different character. Dan is not witnessing past
events. His out-of-court statements are not testimonial because they are
not recollection. They are not backward-looking statements of memory
recalled and are therefore competent even without cross examination.
The Biblical injunction, "Thou shall not bear false witness against thy
neighbor" is often interpreted as, "Thou shall not lie.""' The simplified
rendition is not an accurate paraphrase; "liar" and "false witness" are not
synonymous terms. False witnessing is a much more specific act than ly-
ing. If you lie about where you are going tomorrow, you are telling a false-
hood, but you are not bearing false witness. 1 2 On the other hand, it is
possible to sincerely attempt to tell the truth, as you know it, yet be wrong.
Thus, a truthful person could end up mistakenly bearing false witness. Be-
cause one speaking with sincerity and certainty may yet, due to human
fallibility, testify falsely, there is a further Biblical injunction, "Thou shall
not foreswear thyself."113 Any witness, even a scrupulously honest one,
risks accidentally breaking the false witness commandment.
A witness is a person who gives testimony of his or her recollection
concerning past events. 1 4 If the definition of hearsay focused directly on
the witnessing function and less on a conflated truth standard, the rule
would be more precise and require fewer exceptions.
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
Id. If unsuccessful in invoking the penumbra exception, a defendant may try a due
process or Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause argument.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The statement in Hypothetical II was not sub-
ject to cross examination because it did not occur in court or at a hearing, render-
ing it hearsay. See id.
111. See Exodus 20:16 (King James); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN
CONDITION 278 n.35 (1959) ("Thou shalt not lie (for the commandment: Thou
shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,) is of course of a different
nature.").
112. SeeARENDT, supra note 111, at 278 n.35 (examining distinction between
bearing false witness and lying); see also 2 GERRIT HENDRIK KERSTEN, THE HEIDEL-
BERG CATECHISM IN Fifry-Two SERMONS Pt. 17 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "in mat-
ters of judgment we are to embrace the truth and avoid the lie .... We may not
bear false witness against anyone in such a way that his name, honour, and good
character are injured, rather than promoted.").
113. Matthew 5:33 (King James).
114. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1603 (6th ed. 1990).
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III. WITNESS RECOLLECTION: THE MISSING ELEMENT
A. Federal Common Law of Hearsay
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the United
States Supreme Court applied the federal common law of evidence.
115
The Supreme Court decided two important hearsay cases that are highly
instructive respecting the hearsay rule. Singly and together, they suggest a
memory rather than a truth standard for hearsay.116
The first case was Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon.117 In Hillmon,
the Supreme Court held competent, as against a hearsay exception, a
statement of future intent by an out-of-court declarant. 118 The issue in
Hillmon was whether certain letters referring to an anticipated trip by Wal-
ters with John Hillmon were admissible as competent evidence.1 19
To determine whether Hillmon-type evidence is hearsay, one must un-
dertake a complex analysis under the truth litmus test of the Federal
Rules.120 One must ask questions such as: (1) is the statement potentially
115. SeeJonathan P. Rich, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional Investiga-
tions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 145, 166 n.154 (1988) ("In federal question cases, many
courts prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence had resolved ques-
tions of privilege as a matter of federal common law.").
116. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933) (declining to
extend Hillmon rationale to backward-looking hearsay); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (holding that admissibility turned on fact that
letters were only evidence of decedent's intent, which was material in case).
117. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
118. See id. at 287, 294 (holding that letters written by Walters on March 1,
telling of pending trip with Hillmon to Crooked Creek, were "competent evidence
of the intention of Walters at the time of writing them").
119. See id. at 287-88, 295. On March 18, a body was found in the Crooked
Creek area. See id. at 287. Later, the beneficiary of John Hillmon's life insurance
policy filed a claim. See id. at 285-86. The insurance company argued that the
claim was fraudulent and that the body discovered at Crooked Creek was Walter's
body, not Hillmon's. See id. at 286-87.
If Walters' intent had been carried out, as identified in the letters, that would
have placed both him and Hillmon in the vicinity of Crooked Creek, where the
body was found and initially identified as being Hillmon. See id. at 287-88. The
insurance company argued that the body was that of Walters, who had been invited
to his death by Hillmon as part of an insurance fraud scheme, in which Walter's
body was used to prove Hillmon's death. See id. Thus, although the Walters letters
were evidence that placed both Walters and Hillmon at Crooked Creek, Hillmon's
wife objected that this information was hearsay. See id. at 287.
120. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one being
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."). In analyzing the admissibility of the Wal-
ters letters under the Federal Rules of Evidence today, one would first ask if the
letters were offered for the truth of the matter asserted. In one sense the letters
may not have been offered to show the truth; Walters could have been lying about
his intent, yet they still show that he had some connection with Hillmon. He also
could have been wrong; his plans might have gone the way of other plans of mice
and men. Thus, the letters may not be hearsay at all, particularly if used circum-
stantially to show that Walters had heard of Hillmon. See Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 288.
His stated plans to go to Crooked Creek were circumstantial evidence that, at a
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a lie?; and (2) how much of the weight of the circumstantial evidence
arises from belief in the truth of the asserted statement of intent, as op-
posed to how much weight arises from circumstantial analysis deduced
from the state of mind of Walters?
Of course, even if a statement is hearsay, it may still be admissible
under the state of mind exception. 12 1 The Walter's letters are admissible
under Rule 803(3) as an exception to hearsay. 122 What is lost in this defi-
nition/exception process of analysis is the rhyme and the reason for ad-
mitting testimony such as the letters in Hillmon. The statements are not
testimonial; they are primary evidence having an indicia of reliability dif-
ferent than witness statements. 123
A truth definition of hearsay did not hinder the Supreme Court's
analysis of the Hillmon evidence. 124 Its analysis lacked the in-and-out mod-
minimum, Walters had considered a trip with Hillmon, thus increasing the
probability that he did go because one is more likely to do something one has
considered than something one has not. On the other hand, the facial statement
of intent to go with Hillmon to show that he intended to do so is hearsay in its
declarative import. If it is true that he intended to go with Hillmon, the
probability of his having done so is all the greater. Therefore, the letters may be
considered both hearsay or not hearsay under the current definition.
121. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (explaining that certain testimony is excepted
from hearsay rule, including "statement[s] of the declarant's then existing state of
mind . . . (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identifica-
tion, or terms of declarant's will").
122. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933) (holding that
state of mind, regardless of whether it is directly or circumstantially relevant, is
admissible except to show memory of past events). The circumstantial use of "in-
tent" as a kind of "future tense" hearsay exception would not be apparent to the
uninformed reader of Rule 803(3). See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE:
CASES AND MATERIALs 492-93 n.1 (1997) (explaining that evidence of future con-
duct gathered from inference as to declarant's state of mind at time of statement is
not hearsay when offered circumstantially).
123. See Park, supra note 10, at 57 (noting that supposed risks in reliability of
out-of-court statements make it necessary to determine whether statement is relia-
ble). Park does not believe that these statements should necessarily be considered
hearsay:
This justification [the fact that a statement may be unreliable] for exclud-
ing hearsay depends upon the belief that a witness describing an out-of-
court statement is likely to be less reliable than a witness describing non-
verbal events, or at least that cross examination will be less effective on a
witness to a statement.... [Tiwo risks I have mentioned-inaccuracy of a
declarant's out-of-court statement and inaccurate testimony by an in-
court witness about another's out-of-court statement-create a danger
that unreliable evidence will be presented to the trier. Mere unreliability,
however, is a weak basis for exclusion; after all, evidence of doubtful relia-
bility is routinely admitted in modern courts, on the assumption that the
trier can recognize the infirmities in the testimony and take them into
account in evaluating it.
Id. at 57-58.
124. See Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-96 (noting that actual letters expressed in-
tent as to what actually happened, not memories that had to be tested by cross
25
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ern approach and was therefore more direct. 12 5 The Court simply held
that "whenever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in the
chain of circumstances, it may be proved by contemporaneous oral or writ-
ten declarations of the party. 1 26 Rather than trying to determine whether
the evidence was "for the truth of the matter" and, if so, what exception
might apply, the Court admitted the evidence as being primary and com-
petent.12 7 The Court stated:
The existence of a particular intention in a certain person at a
certain time being a material fact to be proved, evidence that he
expressed that intention at that time is as direct evidence of the fact,
as his own testimony that he then had that intention would
be.... [H] is own memory of his state of mind at a former time is
no more likely to be clear and true than a bystander's recollec-
tion of what he then said. ... "Wherever the bodily or mental
feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual ex-
pression of such feelings are original and competent evidence.' 28
The Supreme Court's analogy of the letters written by Walters to a
verbal act indicates that it did not view the evidence as hearsay.1 29 Or,
more precisely, the Court viewed the issue as being one of drawing the
line between admissibility and nonadmissibility, not as one of defining
hearsay.1 30 "'Such declarations (of bodily or mental feelings) are re-
garded as verbal acts, and are as competent as any other testimony.""31
examination). See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and Applica-
tion of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Permitting Impeachment of Witness by
Evidence of Prior Conviction of Crime, 39 A.L.R. FED. 570, 573 n.2 (1978) (noting that
Federal Rules were not adopted until 1975, well after date Hillmon was decided).
125. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803(3) (referring to way in which statement is con-
sidered hearsay under 801, but allowed in under state of mind exception of
803(3)). Because Hillmon was decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence were
adopted, this "dance" was not necessary. See Rydstrom, supra note 124, at 573 n.2.
126. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295.
127. See id. (explaining that letters written at time Walters considered accom-
panying Hillmon on trip were more probative than would be memory of Walters if
he had lived).
128. Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added) (quoting Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S.
397, 404 (1869)).
129. See id. at 296 (comparing Hillmon facts to that of another case where
statements were admissible because they are "'expressions [of] natural reflexes of
what it might be impossible to show by other testimony"' (quoting Mosley, 75 U.S.
at 404-05)); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.16, at 1096-97 (defining
verbal act as words that "carry legal consequences or logical significance independ-
ent of their assertive aspect"); see also RicE, supra note 27, § 4.01 (B), at 238 (stating
that like statements offered to show effect on listener and statements showing
knowledge, verbal acts are extrajudicial statements that do not violate "truth of the
matter" formulation).
130. See Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 296-98 (discussing competency of evidence as
main issue in admissibility, without becoming bogged down in theoretical discus-
sion of hearsay).
131. Id. at 296 (quoting Mosley, 75 U.S. at 404-05).
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Verbal acts are not hearsay because they have an operation at law
quite apart from any testimonial content. 132 Warnings and notices are
typical examples of verbal acts, as are the words that constitute the forma-
tion of a contract. 133 They are not tales of tales. They involve no witness-
ing function.
One major advantage of the "truth of the matter asserted" test is that
it effectively distinguishes verbal acts, which are admissible, from some,
but not all, inadmissible testimonial statements.13 4 A red light, stop sign
or verbal police order to halt all have the same legal effect-they can re-
sult in a traffic citation. Such verbal acts are not offered for their truth,
but merely to show that a legal fact has occurred.' 35 Legally, the state-
ment's truth or falsity is insignificant.13 6 Because verbal acts are not of-
fered for the "truth of the matter asserted," the hearsay rule does not
affect their admissibility. 137
132. See, e.g., Richard C. Mangrum, The Law of Hearsay in Nebraska, 25 CREICH-
TON L. REv. 499, 506 (1982) (noting that "[clertain verbal acts, such as the words
of a contract, words establishing agency, slanderous words, etc., have legal signifi-
cance because they have been spoken. If offered to prove that they have been
stated they are nonhearsay."). The author used a case in which one partner told
another that "he could have the corn in specific cribs." Id. The court held that
this statement had legal significance referring to the division of their interests and
that, therefore, the statement was nonhearsay. See id. (citing Hanson v. Johnson,
201 N.W. 322 (1924)).
133. See 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 863, at 281-82 (1994) [hereinafter Evi-
dence] (noting that "[flor utterances to be admissible as verbal acts, (1) the con-
duct to be characterized by the words must be independently material to the issue;
(2) the conduct must be equivocal; (3) the words must aid in giving legal signifi-
cance to the conduct; and (4) the words must accompany the conduct"). Warn-
ings, notices and contracts fit into these categories. See, e.g., 4 WEINsTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 801 (c) [01], at 801-65 (1981) (noting that verbal acts occur "when the
utterance is an operative fact which gives rise to legal consequences," such as
notice).
134. See Evidence, supra note 133, § 863, at 281-82 (defining verbal acts); see
also FED R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay as statements offered for truth of matter
asserted).
135. See Evidence, supra note 133, § 863, at 281-82 (noting that words them-
selves can have independent legal significance, regardless of assertive quality, but
stressing that actual words used are important).
136. See Paul I. Birzon, Hearsay There's More to this Evidence than Meets the Ear,
7.2 Fiv. Anvoc. 4, 6-7 (1985) (noting that admissibility of verbal act depends "only
on the utterance of the words and not the truthfulness of the contents. The testi-
mony [is] admissible because it eludes the hearsay rule by definition."). That be-
ing the case, even when verbal acts may be untrue, such as when a sign states,
"Caution, men working," but there are no men present at the time or those pres-
ent are eating or loafing around, the verbal act is still relevant and therefore ad-
missible. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.16, at 1097 (stating that
assertive aspect, or truthfulness, is unimportant in regard to admissibility of verbal
acts).
137. SeeJerome A. Hoffman, Res Gestae's Children, 47 ALA. L. REV. 73, 104-05
(1995) (illustrating that truth or falsity of verbal acts is of no consequence). Hoff-
man stated:
To inquire into the truth or falsity of such words [verbal acts] makes no
sense at all. A proponent does not offer them to prove the truth of the
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Nevertheless, the "truth of the matter asserted" test that eliminates
verbal acts from hearsay does not similarly eliminate Hillmon-type evi-
dence.1 3 8 Yet the Supreme Court in Hillmon was correct in noting a simi-
larity between verbal acts and statements of intent, a similarity that the
truth test does not address. Warnings, notices or the words of a contract
are similar to the Walters letters in that they are not testimonial. 139 Wit-
nesses to verbal acts and to statements of intent are giving testimony, not
testifying as to a "tale of a tale" by an out-of-court declarant. 140
In Shepard v. United States,1 4 1 the Court identified memory as an essen-
tial element of inadmissible hearsay, distinguishing recollection from
other states of mind, such as intent.142 Shepard was a murder case in which
police charged a husband with the poisoning death of his wife. 14 3 At issue
was whether the dead wife's statements, made after the poisoning, but
prior to her death some days later, were admissible.1 44
matter asserted. Such testimony is relevant as words of offer or accept-
ance, or as an expression of intent to convey, whether or not the speaker
had secret reservations about his own purposes. Evidence of such words
is merely offered to show that the words were uttered and, therefore, are
admissible over a hearsay objection, because they are not "offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Id. at 104 (quoting ALA. R. EvD. 801(c)). In other words, a statement deemed a
verbal act is, by its nature, nonhearsay.
138. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (describing
declarations made in Walters' letters as intentions). Because the letters that Wal-
ters wrote ;vere statements of future intent, the words did not accompany the con-
duct and the letters would not be considered verbal acts today.
139. See id. These letters were direct evidence of Walters' intention, just as
the words of a contract are direct evidence having independent legal significance.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.16, at 1097 (noting that words of
contract constitute verbal act).
140. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 249, at 733-34 (illus-
trating that witnesses to verbal acts are not testifying to evidence of assertions, but
to utterances that have legal significance).
141. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
142. See id. at 104-06 (noting that while state of mind may be proved and
admitted as evidence in some cases, in this case testimony was backward-looking
and, therefore, inadmissable).
143. See id. at 97-98.
144. See id. at 102-06. Her statements were, in effect, that she feared Dr. Shep-
ard, her husband, had poisoned her by contaminating a whiskey bottle that he had
given to her. See id. at 97-98 (noting that if inadmissable, these statements would
constitute more than unsubstantial error and verdict could not stand). The gov-
ernment first urged the Court to view Mrs. Shepard's statement as a dying declara-
tion, and therefore find it admissible under that exception. See id. at 99 (holding
that statement was not dying declaration because Mrs. Shepard was not "in the
shadow of impending death"). The government then argued that the statement
should be admitted to rebut the defendant's assertions that Mrs. Shepard was sui-
cidal and may have poisoned herself. See id. at 102-03 (rejecting this argument
because statement was not offered as rebuttal evidence, but to prove Dr. Shepard
killed his wife). Finally, the government tried to convince the Court that this state-
ment fell within the Hillmon rule and could be admitted as evidence of state of
556
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The Supreme Court has identified memory of past events as an im-
portant means of separating admissible from inadmissible out-of-court
statements. 145 In Shepard, Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, distin-
guished Hillmon and concluded, "Declarations of intention, casting light
upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of
memory, pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or
nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored." 146
This conclusion, that our system cannot extend Hillmon to statements
of memory or belief without destroying the hearsay rule totally, is sound.
The Federal Rules of Evidence codify Shepard and Hilimon in the Rule
803(3) exception to herarsay. 147 Under the Rules, Hillmon is a gloss on
the state of mind exception, while Shepard is a limitation on that gloss.1 48
Shepard, however, is much more than this. It defines hearsay because it
more precisely draws the line between admissible and inadmissible state-
ments than the "truth of the matter asserted" rule.14 9
Shepard never attained a central distinguishing role in common law
analysis because the Federal Rules of Evidence intervened. The Rules rele-
gated the Shepard holding to a minor position in the analytical struc-
ture.' 50 In part, this is because the- distinction the Court drew never
convinced Professor Morgan.151 Morgan recognized the important rela-
tionship between preserved memory and hearsay. 15 2 He was reluctant,
however, to abandon the other dangers of hearsay-perception, narration
mind. See id. at 103-06 (holding that Hilimon rule only applied to statements of
intention that look to future, not to past).
145. See id. at 105-06 (holding that statements of future intent must be distin-
guished from "declarations of memory"). The Court noted that Hillmon, while still
good law, is a "high-water line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go." Id.
at 105. If declarations of memory pointing to past events were allowed in as evi-
dence, the hearsay rule would be swallowed. See id. at 106.
146. Id.
147. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). The Rule states:
THEN EXISTING MENTAL, EMOTIONAL, OR PHYSICAL CONDITION. A statement
of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,
pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
Id.
148. See Thomas A. Wiseman, III, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the
Ciminal Defendant: The Limits of the Hillmon Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REv. 659, 681
(1982) (stating that "Shepard defined the scope of the Hillmon doctrine that subse-
quent courts have followed and that Congress eventually codified in rule 803(3)").
149. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.39, at 1252 (referring to
Shepard decision as "[t]he-line-in-the sand approach").
150. See FED. R. EVID 803(3) advisory committee's note (citing Shepard to jus-
tify excluding statements of memory or belief as circumstantial evidence that prior
event caused declarant's mental state).
151. See Hearsay Dangers, supra note 38, at 212-13.
152. See Edmund M. Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Mem-
my, 40 HARv. L. REv. 712, 714 (1927).
19981
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and sincerity.1 53 Although the "truth of the matter" definition of hearsay
tacitly incorporated Morgan's sincerity test, he was reluctant similarily to
promote memory above the other competency dangers.
1 5 4
Professor Morgan's criticism of Shepard rests, at least in part, on con-
cerns over inferential uses of state of mind evidence. 155 He could have
taken the matter further, for all communication rests on memory.
156
Everything we do is based, in part, on past experience. 15 7 In this sense, all
statements are backward-looking statements of memory. 15 8 Additionally,
all statements concerning state of mind inevitably cast a backward shadow
at some level. 159
The Federal Rules limit the inquiry, for the most part, to explicit as-
sertions and do not attempt to delve beyond the surface in search of sub-
terranean hearsay levels.1 60 Thus, Professor Morgan's concern over
153. See id. at 719 (noting that when witness is present in court, "His capaci-
ties of perception, memory, and narration, and his disposition to make an honest
use of them can be satisfactorily examined").
154. See id. at 719-20 (declining to elevate memory above other dangers of
hearsay). The title of Professor Morgan's article, The Relation Between Hearsay and
Preserved Memory, 40 HARV. L. REV. 712 (1927), also suggests the existence of a spe-
cial relationship between hearsay and preserved memory.
155. See Hearsay Dangers, supra note 38, at 212-13 (criticizing Shepard Court's
condemnation of "declarations of memory" because if such declarations were to
reach declarations of intent offered as basis for inferring objective facts that cre-
ated intent, "Such declarations, if used as evidence of what caused the state of
mind, call for just as much reliance on memory and observation as do 'declara-
tions of memory' and likewise cast their light on the past, not on the future" (quot-
ing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933))).
156. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 11, at 27 ("There is no con-
ceivable statement however specific, detailed and 'factual,' that is not in some mea-
sure the product of inference and reflection as well as observation and memory.");
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.39, at 1250 ("Virtually all statements that
carry information about acts, events, or conditions can be characterized as state-
ments of memory because they openly disclose the speaker's thoughts .... ).
157. See DIANE GILLESPIE, THE MIND'S WE: CONTEXTUALISM IN COGNITIVE PSY-
CHOLOGY 55 (1993) (stating that "meaning and significance from past experience
and learning are carried over into interpretations and actions in present situa-
tions"); Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory and
Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 Amiz. L. REV. 287, 313 (1994) (stating that "[t] he
footprints of cognitive experience-the firing of neural networks, however faint,
guide our present endeavors").
158. See Baker, supra note 157, at 313 (arguing that individual's present ac-
tions are guided either consciously or subconsciously by that individual's past
experiences).
159. See GILLESPIE, supra note 157, at 142 (stating that memory "'suffuses, in-
terpenetrates, colors what is now and here uppermost"' (quotingJOHN DEWEY, ART
AS EXPERIENCE 306 (1934))).
160. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (a) ("A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an asser-
tion."). This is an explicit disavowal of the English common law view that implicit
hearsay is forbidden. See Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 266 (H.L. 1992) (con-
tending that Wright court's decision is fundamentally sound); Wright v. Doe d.
Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516 (Ch. 1837) (holding that proof of particular fact
"which is not of itself a matter in issue, but which is relevant only as implying a
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memory at the inferential level is itself backward-looking. A recollection
test can differentiate recollected events recorded in memory from all
other statements that have some memory component. What's more, the
distinction is essential to proper hearsay analysis at some point. The prob-
lem cannot be avoided by transferring it to an exception rather than incor-
porating it as part of the definition.
Rule 803(3)'s "state of mind" exception and the nonhearsay state of
mind evidence rule muddles the minds of most trial lawyers and judges
because the distinction is both analytically difficult and totally academic.
Ultimately, it makes no difference to admissibility; therefore, state of mind
is a favorite hearsay "exception" with the bar.161 The ticklish distinction
between hearsay and nonhearsay state of mind statements is only made
necessary because the authors of the Rules codified Shepard as part of an
exception, rather than as part of the rule.' 62 While this added considera-
ble analytic complexity, the codification did not achieve greater precision
within the rule.
The distinction between Shepard backward-looking memory and
Hillmon-type evidence may lack the precision of scientific, objective mea-
surement. It is, however, a distinction that more accurately than truth
identifies the interface between admissible and inadmissible extrajudicial
statements. A recollection test would focus on as important a factor as
credibility in distinguishing between admissible and inadmissible extraju-
dicial statements.
B. Confrontation Clause Analogy
The hearsay rule is the traditional means for assuring a live, adver-
sarial trial and for preserving the right of cross examination, but it is not
the only rule designed for this purpose. In criminal cases, the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Constitution also safeguards the adversarial ti'al.163
statement or opinion of a third person on the matter in issue, is impermissible in
all cases where such a statement or opinion not on oath would be of itself
inadmissible").
161. See David E. Seidelson, The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 13.2
DuQ. L. REv. 251, 251 (1974) ("The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule
may be, simultaneously, the most elusive and the most pernicious of the many
hearsay exceptions."); see also Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, A.B.A. LITIG.,
Winter, 1983, at 13, 14 (stating that state of mind exception is one of attorneys'
favorite methods to admit hearsay evidence).
162. See FED. R. EvD. 803(3) (excluding from admission into evidence "a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed").
163. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990) (discussing rationale be-
hind Confrontation Clause and role it serves in adversarial trial); Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (noting that Confrontation Clause provides safeguards
against having convictions based on statements of unseen and unknown individu-
als); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 403, 494 (1992) ("Confrontation Clause ... ensur[es] reliability by
subjecting the evidence 'to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceed-
ing before the trier of fact."' (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 836)).
1998]
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The Supreme Court's statement that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values" reflects the close
relationship between hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.1 6 4 At the
heart of both the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause is the right
to cross examine witnesses and to have them appear live in front of the
finder of fact.
16 5
The Supreme Court has carefully avoided, in its Confrontation Clause
cases, the constitutionalization of hearsay.166 It has also eschewed the
structure of hearsay in constitutional cases. 16 7 Rejecting an approach that
would forbid all hearsay, the Court determined that the Confrontation
Clause would not bar out-of-court statements if they bore an "indicia of
reliability" and if the witness was unavailable. 1 68
164. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (finding that there is con-
gruence between hearsay rules and Confrontation Clause, but there is not com-
plete overlap).
165. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 78 (1980) (finding that heart of this
constitutional guarantee is accused's right to compel witness "'to stand face to face
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief'" (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895))). One should
note that the Court in Mattox found both credibility and cross examination of rec-
ollection as the rationale underlying the right to confront. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at
243; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion)
("The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal de-
fendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to
conduct cross examination."); Kentucky v. Stincer 482 U.S. 730, 749 (1986) (Mar-
shallJ., dissenting) (asserting that Confrontation Clause provides right for defend-
ant to cross examine adverse witnesses).
166. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("It seems
apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary
hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two,
and we decline to do so now.") (footnotes omitted); Green, 399 U.S. at 155 ("While
it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are
generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest
that the overlap is complete .... Our decisions have never established such a con-
gruence."); see also Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted" Exceptions to the Con-
frontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1987) ("The hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause are similar in that both exclude from evidence certain out-of-
court assertions. However, the two are not coextensive and do not always exclude
the same assertions.") (footnotes omitted); Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Con-
tours of Unavailability and Reliability for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
189, 195 (1993) (noting that hearsay rules of evidence and Confrontation Clause
do not serve exactly same functions).
167. See Susan W. Brenner, The Revival of "Trial by Affidavit," 18 U.S.C. § 3505
and the Requirements of the Confrontation Clause, 41 ARK. L. REV. 323, 343 (1988)
(stating that Confrontation Clause countenances only hearsay marked with trust-
worthiness); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U.
FLA. L. REv. 863, 881 (1988) (noting that when traditional hearsay rules are satis-
fied, Confrontation Clause requirements are also complied with).
168. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-66 (noting that where witness is unavailable, for
statement to be placed before jury, statement must bear "an indicia of reliability");
see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) ("[O]nce a witness is shown to be
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The first criterion is reliability. Reliability may be met by citing a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception or by a demonstration that the circum-
stances surrounding the statement suggest, internally, that the statement is
not a falsification.1 69 There must be something about the time, place and
nature of the extrajudicial statement that makes it admissible without cross
examination. 170
Similarly, internal indicia of reliability are found in most enumerated
exceptions to hearsay. The Rules codify recurring examples of instances
where the Court found something in the nature and quality of the state-
ment, combined with the circumstances of its making, to justify admis-
sion. 17 1 Both traditional hearsay analysis and Confrontation Clause
analysis agree that the right to cross examine witnesses depends on factors
inherent in the out-of-court statement. 172
unavailable, 'his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of relia-
bility."' (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66)).
169. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 805 ("The reliability requirement can be met
where the statement either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or is sup-
ported by a showing of 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66)); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 200 (1987)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that indicia of reliability is required to promote
accuracy and trustworthiness and can be found in either "firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions" or particularized indicia of reliability); Michael H. Graham, Indicia of
Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecu-
tions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 54 (1985) ("This ad hoc assessment is to be based
upon the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including corroborating facts
such as physical evidence, inconsistent facts, and the assessed credibility of the
declarant, all considered in the light of the traditional 'firmly rooted' exceptions
to the hearsay rule."); Deborah M. Kupa, Note and Comment, Erosion of the Con-
frontation Clause in the Ocean State: Admitting Declarations of a Decedent Made in Good
Faith, 1 ROGER WILJAMS U. L. Rv. 137, 145 (1996) (stating that reliability can be
met where evidence falls within "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or where totality
of circumstances surrounding statement guarantees trustworthiness).
170. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (placing indicia of
reliability standard on extrajudicial declarations of. unavailable witnesses even
though Confrontation Clause prefers face-to-face confrontations); see also Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions From the Constitutional Unavaila-
bility Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665, 687-89 (1986) (noting instances where indi-
cia of reliability based on time, place and nature of statement justify admission of
extrajudicial statement).
171. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87-88 (finding that indicia of reliability, provided
by nature and timing of statement, justified admission of hearsay statement with-
out offending Confrontation Clause).
172. See Phillip Halpern, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for Truth in
Criminal Trials, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 165, 166-68 (1989) (noting that if witness is un-
available, then statement may be admissible without cross examination if hearsay
statement bears adequate indicia of reliability); Elanor L. Owen, The Confrontation
Clause Applied to Minor Victims of Sexual Abuse, 42 VAND. L. Ruv. 1511, 1529-31
(1989) (stating that surrounding circumstances can provide adequate indicia of
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The second criterion requires that the declarant be unavailable or
that the statement is "not replicable" by testimony. 17 3 Thus, the lack of
testimonial quality is important in two respects. First, it bears on indicia of
reliability.' 7 4 Second, it overrides the need to show that the witness is
available. 175
Justice Thomas, concurring in White v. Illinois,176 attempts to outline
an approach to Confrontation Clause cases.1 77 In addition to the right to
cross examine witnesses who actually testify, Justice Thomas would also
forbid extrajudicial testimony. 178 He opines that the Confrontation
Clause prohibits testimonial materials when the witness is not present.17 9
Although one might disagree with the narrow range of materials that Jus-
tice Thomas would construe as testimonial, the distinction is otherwise
sound and can be used to explain why some extrajudicial statements, in-
cluding some "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions," need no showing of un-
availability while others do.' 8 0 Justice Thomas asks the Court, in some
future case, to consider the meaning of "witness against," as used in the
173. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (noting that some-
times statements derive much of their value from fact that statements are made in
context very different from trial and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substan-
tive evidence).
174. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992) (concluding that state-
ments that are incapable of replication can not recapture reliability even in later
in-court testimony); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182 (finding that where statements are
not capable of replication, no additional test for indicia of reliability is necessary).
175. See Norman M. Garland, An Overview of Relevance and Hearsay: A Nine Step
Analytical Guide, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 1039, 1071 (1993) (noting that witness unavaila-
bility adds little benefit if statement at issue was made in context that could not be
replicated in court, thus disposing of unavailability requirement); Glen Weis-
senberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REv.
145, 166 (1991) (dispensing of unavailability requirement is permissible when evi-
dence is not readily subject to replication).
176. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
177. See id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas suggests:
One possible formulation is as follows: The federal constitutional right of
confrontation extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only inso-
far as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affi-
davits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was this discrete
category of testimonial materials that was historically abused ....
Id.
178. See id. (Thomas,J., concurring) (opining that allowing extension of Con-
frontation Clause to extrajudicial testimony contained in formalized documents
would result in depriving criminal defendants of benefits of adversarial process
and failure of preventing evils at which Confrontation Clause was directed).
179. See id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The United States... has sug-
gested that the Confrontation Clause should apply only to those persons who pro-
vide in-court testimony or the functional equivalent .... This interpretation is in
some ways more consistent with the text and history of the Clause than our current
jurisprudence.").
180. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (holding that unavail-
ability must be shown when evidence is "weaker substitute" for in-court witness).
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Confrontation Clause.' 8 ' The inquiry would be instructive not only for
interpreting the Constitution, but also for hearsay, because not everyone
who speaks is "witnessing."182
While the jurisprudence of Confrontation Clause analysis remains in
many respects uncertain, the need to grapple with the problems of extra-
judicial statements outside the confined structure of the codified hearsay
rules has led to insight that we can transfer to the analysis of hearsay.
While cross examination is an important procedural safeguard for some
kinds of statements, it is ineffective and inappropriate for others.183 This
latter class consists of primary evidence that would, if replicated from the
witness stand, lose its character and probative force. 184 This was true in
the case of the letters in Hillmon-if Walters (or the ghost of Walters) was
called to the stand to testify that he went to Crooked Creek with Hillmon,
it would not have the same quality of persuasiveness as letters written
before the event, when there was no inkling of possible homicide. 185
The same nontestimonial quality can be found in the statements of
the four-year-old girl in White who awoke her sitter with a scream, com-
plained to her mother as soon as feasible that a man had attacked her and
promptly repeated details to a police officer and examining doctor.' 86
The probative value of statements of a frightened child seeking comfort
from her mother and other care-providing adults has a different probative
value than would subsequent testimony by that child. 187 Distinguishing
181. See White, 502 U.S. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I respectfully sug-
gest that, in an appropriate case, we reconsider how the phrase 'witness against' in
the Confrontation Clause pertains to the admission of hearsay.").
182. See id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that unfortunately, in re-
cent cases in this area, Supreme Court has assumed that all hearsay declarants are
"witnesses against" defendants within meaning of Confrontation Clause, even
those in which declarant is not "witnessing").
183.. See Garland, supra note 175, at 1071 (recognizing that cross examination
of witness does not provide additional safeguard or produce statements with more
probative value when statement is made in context that cannot be replicated by
live, in-court testimony).
184. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395 (noting that certain statements are incapable of
being replicated due to circumstances under which statement was made, and even
if party is required to take stand, party's in-court testimony seldom will reproduce
significant portion of evidentiary value of out-of-court statement).
185. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (noting
that even if Walters had still been alive, that information would be "no more likely
to be clear and true than a bystander's recollection of what he then said, and
[would be] less trustworthy than letters written by him at the very time and under
circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresentation"). The fact that Wal-
ters intended to go with Hillmon to the place where the body was found made it
more probable that he did go with Hillmon and that it might have been his dead
body found in Hillmon's camp. See id. at 295-96.
186. See White, 502 U.S. at 349-50.
187. See id. at 356 (finding victim's out-of-court statements had "substantial
probative value"). The immediate complaint of a victim of crime is often called a
"hue and cry." The inference drawn from the immediate behavior, verbal or non-
verbal, of a participant in an event is not the same as inferences drawn from subse-
19981
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testimonial extrajudicial statements from the child's statements at bar, the
Court admitted the statements not only due to their highly probative value
but also because that value was not testimonial in quality or nature.1 88
Where an inference drawn from an out-of-court statement is not the
same as an inference that could be drawn from in-court testimony to the
same effect, cross examination is not a legitimate issue and the hearsay
exclusionary rule should not apply.189 Not surprisingly, many of the
"firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions have just the quality identified in
White.190 Most exceptions to the hearsay rule are neither testimonial, wit-
nessing, recollection of past events nor a tale of a tale.
IV. ELIMINATING EXCEPTIONS
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit an attorney to introduce some
out-of-court statements, even for the truth of the matter asserted. These
permissible extrajudicial statements are classified as: excluded from hear-
say; excepted from hearsay, regardless of witness unavailability; or ex-
cepted from hearsay, only if the declarant is unavailable at trial. 19 1 The
quent testimony. The special evidentiary and substantive value of a hue and cry
has been recognized at least since Biblical times. See Deuteronomy 22:23-29 (King
James).
188. See White, 502 U.S. at 356. The Court concluded:
They are thus materially different from the statements at issue in Roberts,
where the out-of-court statements sought to be introduced were them-
selves made in the course of a judicial proceeding, and where there was
consequently no threat of lost evidentiary value if the out-of-court state-
ments were replaced with live testimony.... We therefore think it clear
that the out-of-court statements admitted in this case had substantial pro-
bative value, value that could not be duplicated simply by the declarant
later testifying in court.
Id. This analysis mirrors the traditional justification for many of the exceptions
that do not require unavailability.
189. See, e.g., id. (noting that value of victim's out-of-court statements could
not be duplicated by declarant's later testifying in court).
190. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990) (stating "if the
declarant's truthfulness is so clear from surrounding circumstances that the test of
cross examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar
admission of the statement at trial"); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182(1987) (finding co-conspirator exception to be "firmly rooted" and noting that
inquiry into reliability of co-conspirator's statement is not required by Constitu-
tion); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (noting that "competing interests"
may outweigh necessity of confrontation at trial).
191. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (delineating statements that are not hearsay).
Rule 801 (d) (1) permits the introduction of prior statements of a witness who testi-
fied at a trial or hearing and was subject to cross examination regarding those
statements, as long as the statements are:
(A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identi-
fication of a person made after perceiving the person.
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first two categories consist of primary evidence. Only a few exceptions,
codified under Rule 804, require a showing of necessity due to the unavail-
ability of the witness.1 9 2
The Appendix to this Article suggests, at least in outline form, how
the current hearsay exceptions would fare under a witness recollection tes-
timonial hearsay definition.' 9 3 It would be unnecessarily tedious to do so
in the text. It will be useful, however, to focus briefly on two broad catego-
ries of Rule 803 exceptions: res gestae and recorded matter.19 4
A. Res gestae
Few areas of the common law of hearsay are in greater disrepute than
the doctrine of res gestae.l95 Dean Wigmore comments, "The phrase res
gestae is, in the present state of the law, not only entirely useless, but even
positively harmful .... It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a
vicious element in our legal phraseology. It should never be
mentioned." 19 6
Professor Morgan agrees that the term is worthless. 19 7 He thoroughly
dissected the categories of statements to which courts apply the term res
gestae and concluded that many were not hearsay because they were verbal
acts or their equivalent.19 8 He identified three categories of extrajudicial
res gestae statements that the authors of the 'Rules subsequently codified as
exceptions to hearsay in Rule 803(1)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (1). Subsection 2 of the same rule permits the introduction of
statements that constitute admissions by the opposing party. FED. R. EVID.
801(d) (2). Rule 803 governs the admissibility of statements made by a witness,
when the witness is available at trial. FED. R. EvID. 803. Finally, Rule 804 governs
the admissibility of statements made by a witness who is unavailable at trial. FED. R.
EVID. 804.
192. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, § 8.77 (suggesting that unavail-
ability may not be constitutional requirement for all 804(b) exceptions, noting, in
particular, statements against interest). Some statements against interest may be
primary and others testimonial. See id. The issue has not had to be determined
under modern hearsay structure, but may someday have to be reached under Con-
frontation Clause analysis.
193. For the proposed redefinition of hearsay, see infra Appendix A.
194. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (containing res gestae and recorded matter
exceptions).
195. See 6 WIjMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1745, at 132 (describing
phrase res gestae as "inexact and indefinite in its scope").
196. Id.
197. See Morgan, Suggested Classification, supra note 25, at 234-35 (calling res
gestae "uncertain" and "vague").
198. See id. (stating that "verbal act" often admitted as part of res gestae would
not be classified as hearsay today because it constitutes part of operative facts of




Ireland: Deconstructing Hearsay's Structure: Toward a Witness Recollection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
dence.1 99 In effect, Professor Morgan broke up res gestae into its compo-
nent parts, some of which were statements not offered for their truth and
others of which have since become the modern exceptions for present
sense impression, excited utterance and then-existing mental, emotional
or physical condition.2 00
Neither Wigmore nor Morgan searched the foreign and unscientific
category of res gestae evidence for a commonality rather than for distinc-
tions.20 1 Yet a commonality does exist. Courts used the term res gestae to
admit evidence that was not testimonial; that is, evidence that did not con-
stitute witness recollection. 20 2 The probative worth of res gestae utterances
lies in their nontestimonial quality and in the irrelevance of cross exami-
nation for testing their worth, as the three modern exceptions demon-
strate.20 3 If one substituted the term nontestimonial statement for the
Latin term res gestae, the utility of the concept might not have met such
scholarly resistance.
A startled utterance made contemporaneously with a startling event is
not a statement recalled from memory. 20 4 It is an exclamation respecting
the present. 20 5 Likewise, a present sense impression must be in the pres-
ent tense, conceptually if not grammatically. Once again, there is no ele-
199. See id. at 233-39 (outlining present sense impression, excited utterance
and then-existing mental, emotional or physical condition exceptions); see also FED.
R. EVID. 801.
200. See Suggested Classification, supra note 25, at 229-31 (analyzing component
parts of res gestae); see alsoJohn R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the
Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IowA L. REV. 869, 869 (1981)
("[T] he res gestae concept may divide, split, and take new forms, but it is omnipres-
ent."). For a discussion of the common origin of the res gestae exceptions and
suggesting a need to interpret them consistently, in view of their common heri-
tage, see generally William G. Passannate, Note, Res gestae, The Present Sense Impres-
sion Exception and Extrinsic Corroboration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and Its
State Counterparts, 17 FoRDHAM URm. L.J. 89 (1988-89). For an analysis of the views
of Wigmore and Morgan on the various res gestae exceptions, see generally Ronald
M. Hutchins & David Sleisinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 432 (1928).
201. See generally 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1745, at 131-33 (fail-
ing to note commonalities); Suggested Classification, supra note 25, at 233-39 (distin-
guishing cases without noting commonalities).
202. See 6 WIGMOmRE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1745, at 132-33 (defining res
gestae).
203. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note (discussing first three
hearsay exceptions).
204. See McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 272 ("The rationale for the
(startled utterance) exception lies in the special reliability that is furnished when
excitement suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and fabrication."); Aviva
Orenstein, My God! A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 159 (1997) (suggesting that absence of opportunity to
fabricate justification is suspect).
205. See Suggested Classification, supra note 25, at 238 (stating guaranty of trust-
worthiness "lies in its spontaneity").
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ment of recollection present.20 6 Finally, a then-existing mental, emotional
or physical condition requires that the focus be on the present or the fu-
ture, not on past recollection. 20 7 The authors of the Rules explicitly incor-
porated the backward-looking element of memory, identified as a key
hearsay distinction in Shepard, into Rule 803(3).208 The Rule, however,
also implicitly identifies the res gestae common law root from which it
sprang.
Of the four hearsay dangers identified by Professor Morgan-narra-
tion, perception, memory and sincerity-res gestae evidence may suffer
from the first two dangers, but never from the last two. That is, whether
for the truth of the matter or not, the only evidence that the hearsay rule
actually excludes is evidence-with the danger of faulty memory (in the
sense of recollection) or sincerity (in the sense of credibility).209 Possible
defects in narration and perception alone do not render extrajudicial
statements inadmissible.2 10
Professor Tribe came to a similar, though not identical, conclusion
respecting the relative importance of the declarant's belief system as an
alternative to the "truth of the matter" formulation. 2 11 Recognizing that
"another elaborate argument for the reform of hearsay law might be in
order," Professor Tribe undertook a more modest task of suggesting the
relationship between the four dangers of hearsay. He suggested the need
to focus on two chains of inference. The first chain contains dangers of
ambiguity and insincerity; the second chain leads from belief of the declar-
ant through possible erroneous memory and faulty perception. 212 Tribe
thus coupled the four dangers into two pairs, each containing one of the
two key elements of hearsay-credibility and recollection. 21 3
206. See id. (differentiating between declarations of past intent and intent
contemporaneous with transaction).
207. See id. at 236 (discussing requirements for then-existing mental, emo-
tional or physical condition exception).
208. See FED. R. EVD. 803 advisory committee's note (discussing statements of
memory). The advisory committee stated that statements of memory must be ex-
cluded "to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule . . . ." Id.
209. See Suggested Classification, supra note 25, at 239 (noting likelihood of
truthfulness in author's classifications of res gestae).
210. See id. (stating that "the opportunity to cross examine the witness in
court concerning the event" greatly diminishes danger of statement "being given
greater weight than it deserves").
211. See Tribe, supra note 97, at 958-59 (introducing theory of Testimonial
Triangle, defined as path of inferences grouped by problems with testimony,
designed to make identification of hearsay problems and structuring of exceptions
easier).
212. See id. at 959 (diagramming Testimonial Triangle).
213. See id. at 958-59 (noting that "[hearsay testimony] inaccuracies are usu-
ally attributed to the four testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty
perception, and erroneous memory" (citing Wright v. Tatham, 5 C & F. 670, 7 Eng.
Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838); 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 3-7)).
Tribe coupled ambiguity and insincerity into one pair, and combined memory and
faulty perception into the other pair. See id. at 958.
19981 567
39
Ireland: Deconstructing Hearsay's Structure: Toward a Witness Recollection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The coupling of ambiguity and insincerity is interesting in that it
roughly parallels a veracity definition of "truth."214 The second chain sug-
gested by Professor Tribe, coupling memory and perception, is particu-
larly insightful in that it identifies the missing recollection element of
hearsay.2 1 5 It is this second element that forms no part of the current
hearsay definition.21 6 The memory of past perceptions, recalled to con-
sciousness, is the definition of recollection that this Article suggests is the
missing element of hearsay.
Modern psychological theory sees memory as a dynamic process in
which the mind constantly restructures recollections. 217 A simple memory
is broken up into categories where each part is subject to confabulation by
the overlay of subsequent memories. 21 8 Recollection consists of an active
reconstruction from among these disparate memory patterns.219 Testi-
214. See id. at 959 (noting that to successfully move along chain of inference
from action or utterance to declarant's belief, these two obstacles must be over-
come). Both ambiguity and insincerity are related to veracity, as is equivocation in
narration.
215. See id. (noting that to successfully move along chain of inference from
action or utterance or declarant's belief to external fact asserted, these second two
obstacles must be removed).
216. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and containing no discussion of
recollection as element of hearsay).
217. See Lawrence S. Kubie, Comment, Implications for Legal Procedure of the
Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 61-66 (1959) (discussing various
components of "memory" and various ways these components are distorted, and
noting that "[w] hat we call 'memory' actually consists of several components" and
that there are five "major components of memory: the perceptual components,
the recording components, the processing components, the reliving components
and finally the components of representation by means of verbal symbols" each of
which "is vulnerable to distortions of several kinds"); see also Landsman, supra note
93, at 551-52 (noting that "[t]he only possible means of dealing with these
problems is to fashion procedures that encourage the earliest possible articulation
and recording of recollections"); R.T.C., Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influ-
enced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv. 1203, 1213 (1981) (discussing "'reconstructive the-
ory' of memory, in which the process of remembering is thought to involve
reconstructing events based on fragments of experience," which "recognizes that
even in ordinary situations memories can be reconstructed in ways that do not
correspond to actual events"); Thomas M. Tomlinson, Note, Pattern-Based Memory
and the Writing Used to Refresh, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1461, 1468-70 (1995) (discussing
pattern-based memory model theory, which stands for proposition that "memories
of similar events and ideas are stored together and overlaid on top of each other,
forming a single basic pattern for any type of memory").
218. See Tomlinson, supra note 217, at 1470-74 (observing that "[if] a witness
has enough time for the memory to blend with a pattern and that scope of the
memory being retrieved is not artificially small, the retrieval cue will result in pres-
entation of an image of the blended pattern rather than the original memory as it
was perceived" and thus, in regard to eyewitness testimony, "there is the danger of
an error in the witness's encoding, retention, or retrieval of memories").
219. See R.T.C., supra note 217, at 1213 (discussing reconstructive theory of
memory that "points out the importance of obtaining recollections under circum-
stances that minimize the danger of distortion of the original memory").
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mony is thus an active mental process, far more complex than simple re-
trieval.2 20 A cross examiner participates in this process, plumbing for
missing details not only to find intentionally withheld information, but
also as a means of restructuring the whole of the testimony.22 '
Professor Imwinkelried, an evidence scholar, effectively argued that
the law of evidence had focused on the risk of insincere testimony to the
virtual exclusion of another, perhaps greater risk, faulty memory. 222 He
viewed the memory factor at work in Rule 803(1) and Rule 803(3), and he
identified memory, distinct from veracity, as an important aspect of hear-
say analysis.2 23 Perhaps more so than veracity, recollection is the element
that cross examination can effectively test.224 He stated that "the common
law long assumed that the primary hearsay danger was the declarant's in-
sincerity, and that the other hearsay risks such as imperfect memory were
of only secondary importance. That assumption had a decisive impact on
the nature of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule."22 5 The sin-
gular focus on veracity also had a decisive impact on the definition of
hearsay.2 2
6
220. See, e.g., Landsman, supra note 93, at 549 (noting that "wide range of
distorting influences" on testimony can be "a major cause of adjudicatory error").
221. See id. at 554-55 (stating that "advocates generally seek to reshape testi-
mony to fit the needs of their cases" and that "[t] his reshaping usually takes place
during sessions in which the witness is asked to present his testimony, and ques-
tions are then carefully structured to elicit desired responses"). Landsman further
stated that "[r] ehearsal increases the likelihood that the witness's story will become
frozen in a fixed pattern" and that "[i]t also provides the witness with innumerable
suggestions about what the attorney thinks are the right answers [and] the availa-
bility of such suggestions will lead a significant number of witnesses to conform
their stories to the interviewing attorney's expectations." Id. at 555. Landsman
also noted that "[riehearsal is designed to and succeeds in affecting witness's nar-
ratives [and] [i]n many cases it substitutes the attorney's words for those of the
witness." Id. Landsman further noted that in this scenario, "The lawyer's influence
will frequently be amplified because [he or] she is perceived by the witness as a
person of high status and because [his or] her influence, is exerted immediately
before testimony is to be given in court." Id. The effect of all of this is that "[o] nce
a substitution has taken place there is virtually no hope of retrieving the original
perceptions." Id. at 555-56.
222. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyz-
ing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt-and Quickly Forgotten,
41 FLA. L. REv. 215, 218 (1989) (noting that both Thucydides and modern re-
searchers "have found that deficiencies in the memory factor are a far more impor-
tant cause of testimonial error than subjective insincerity").
223. See id. at 231 (noting that these rules "indicate that the presence of facts
ensuring the quality of the declarant's memory weighs strongly in favor of admit-
ting the declarant's hearsay statement" (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(1) ("Present Sense
Impression"); FED. R. EVID. 803(3) ("Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical
Condition"))).
224. See Gardner, supra note 91, at 402-06 (explaining that cross examination
may provide opportunity to expose elements of suggestion, coaching, leading
questions and bias or prejudice or sympathy in testimony of witness).
225. Imwinkelried, supra note 222, at 217.
226. See BuRR W. JoNEs, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 297, at 451 (3d
ed. 1924) ("One of the most important of the rules excluding certain classes of
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If our legal system defined hearsay so that it only applied to testimo-
nial-type statements, that is, statements that have both credibility and rec-
ollection components, the first three Rule 803 hearsay exceptions would
not be necessary. The same is true of many other "primary" exceptions
found in Rule 803, in which past events are recorded, not in memory, but
in written records, such as shop books.227
B. Shop Books
Records of regularly conducted business activities are admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule, provided they are "made at or
near the time" of the transaction and meet other requirements of regular-
ity.228 Rule 803 has numerous other exceptions for memoranda made
"when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory."229 Some admit extra-
judicial memoranda even if not contemporaneous. 230 Yet, for the most
part, the hearsay exceptions contained in Rule 803 admit evidence that is
not testimonial and for which cross examination would be fruitless. 231
A marriage certificate meeting the requirements of Rule 803(12) be-
comes a hearsay exception because a properly authenticated marriage cer-
tificate proves a marriage in a way that is quite different from the
testimony of a witness who was present at the wedding ceremony. 232 The
certificate does not consist of past events recorded in memory and then
testimony is that which rejects hearsay evidence. By this is meant . . . evidence
which . . . rests also in part on the veracity and competency of some other person
from whom the witness may have received his information.") (emphasis added).
227. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6) ("Records of Regularly Conducted Activ-
ity"); see also FED. R. EvD. 803(8) ("Public Records and Reports"); FED. R. EVID.
803 (9) ("Records of Vital Statistics"); FED. R. EVID. 803 (11) ("Records of Religious
Organizations"); FED. R. EviD. 803(12) ("Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar Certifi-
cates"); FED. R. EVID. 803(13) ("Family Records"); FED. R. EVID. 803(14) ("Records
of Documents Affecting an Interest in Property").
. 228. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) ("Records of Regularly Conducted Activity").
For a history of the shop book exceptions, see generally John E. Tracy, The Intro-
duction of Documentary Evidence, 24 IowA L. REv. 436 (1939).
229. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(5) ("Recorded Recollection").
230. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(13) ("Family Records"); FED. R. EVID. 803(16)
("Statements in Ancient Documents").
231. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111 (1943) (distinguishing between
testimonial and nontestimonial records and holding that written "statement at a
freight office of petitioners where he was interviewed by an assistant superinten-
dent of the road and by a representative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Com-
mission . . . offered in evidence by petitioners ... was properly excluded").
232. See FED. R. EvID. 803(12) (allowing hearsay exception for "[s]tatements
of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other
ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or
other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by
law to perform the act certified," if certificate is purported to have been issued at
time of act or within reasonable time thereafter).
[Vol. 43: p. 529
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later recalled, as would be the case of a witness testifying at some later
time. 23
3
Although it has been traditional to view memory as a kind of tape
recording in which the quality may fade or a memory may even be erased,
long-term memory does not operate in such a precise and unambiguous
manner. 2 34 Rather, it changes during retention, as "every time we recall
an event, we must reconstruct the memory, and with each recollection the
memory may be changed. '2 35 This is why the ability to cross examine
recollections is important-to attempt to untangle the intricate web of rec-
ollected matter that constitutes testimony. Long-term memory is subjec-
tive and variable, not objective and concrete. 23 6 According to recent
commentators:
Truth and reality, when seen through the filter of our memories,
are not objective facts but subjective, interpretative realities. We
interpret the past, correcting ourselves, adding bits and pieces,
deleting uncomplimentary or disturbing recollections, sweeping,
dusting, tidying things up. Thus our representation of the past
takes on a living, shifting reality.
23 7
This pattern of recall, reconstruction, deconstruction, editing and or-
ganizing is absent, or nearly absent, from shop books and official records.
In this literate era, we often substitute a written notation for long-term
memory. 238 The memorandum may be in error, but not because some
233. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., 1 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 2.3, at 92 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that "[a] common procedure is
for the person solemnizing the marriage to fill in the blanks on the marriage li-
cense and then send it to the place of recording"). This is a customary practice,
which, while not mandated in every state, is required to be completed within a set
time period by some state statutes. See, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1504 (West
1991) ("The duplicate certificate shall be signed by the person or by a member of
the religious society, institution or organization solemnizing the marriage and re-
turned for recording within ten days to the court which issued the license.").
234. See Orenstein, supra note 204, at 223.
235. ELIZABETH Lo-rus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE 20
(1991).
236. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1533-34 (stating that evolution in understand-
ing of mental process of memory, as it related to testimony, has resulted in occa-
sional lobbying for general acceptance of recent perception hearsay exception).
237. Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 235, at 20.
238. See MarkJ. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 477 n.52 (1995) (rejecting assumption "that people in
preliterate societies have better developed memories and more detailed recall-
presumably because they cannot turn to documents as a mnemonic crutch-than
those in modern, literate societies"). Nonetheless, memory retention depends
heavily on careful, original observation. For example, the store clerk who enters a
sale at the time of the sale makes an attempt to remember and thus typically
promptly forgets the event. Some years later, the memorandum may remain. In
an unusual case, a vestigial memory may exist in the mind of the clerk. In any
event, the memorandum is a different form of evidence than the clerk's subse-
quent testimonial recollection. The passage of time and a myriad of intervening
19981
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intervening mood or event has morphed it. Memoranda of the type typi-
cally excepted from hearsay under Rule 803 are based on perceptions that
initially may have been faulty. Nevertheless, that error is objectively frozen
at the time the exceptions are recorded. 23 9 The mental process of recol-
lection, with its attendant uncertainties, plays no part in written memo-
randa made contemporaneously with a perception. Thus, when a written
memorandum, especially if made for some routine purpose, falls within a
hearsay exception, it is admitted, not because it contains the element of
truth, but because it lacks the dangers of recollection.
V. CONCLUSION
The current hearsay formula, which states that evidence is not hearsay
unless it includes "out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of
matter asserted," is not a scientific certainty. Nor should it be treated as
an article of faith. Rather, it is an effective device for identifying some out-
of-court statements that the court should admit because the statement is
primary, as opposed to testimonial, evidence. The formula is effective in
admitting out-of-court statements representing verbal acts or proving the
operative facts of a case. For example, the words of a contract are relevant
without regard to their testimonial quality or truth. Similarly, statements
used to create a circumstantial inference rather than a direct inference
are, by operation of the traditional formula, not excludible as hearsay. For
example, statements testing the memory of the declarant concerning in-
criminating information provide an entirely different inference of guilt
than that of a confession resting on belief in the veracity and accuracy of
the declarant. The accepted definition of hearsay, set forth in Rule
801(c), would not have stood the test of time had it no utility. Nonethe-
less, the definition is defective in that it fails to identify many other pri-
mary, nontestimonial extrajudicial statements.
The Federal Rules approach is to create exceptions that permit admis-
sion, notwithstanding the over-generalization of the Rule. These primary
exceptions, mostly codified in Rule 803, are not tales of tales. They are
not second best forms of evidence. What is suggested here is a redefining
of hearsay to eliminate the need for most of these exceptions without
changing the admissibility requirements.
When a definition is over-inclusive, one possible source of error may
lie in the failure to identify one or more of the operative elements. The
common element found in a large number of hearsay exceptions is recol-
transactions will likely cloud an individual's recollection. The shop record will not
be subject to this dynamic process.
239. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(6) (requiring memorandum or report to be
"made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity"). Accu-
racy and error are objectively frozen. If the dynamic memory reconstruction pro-
cess plays an important role, the requirements of these exceptions will not have
been satisfied.
[Vol. 43: p. 529
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lection of past events. Recollection of matters stored in memory differs, as
a mental process, from short-term memory. When an event is fresh in the
mind, the belief system of the observer has had less opportunity to infect
the data. The process of retrieval of recollected testimonial material is
highly subjective and suspect. It is also this kind of testimonial evidence
for which cross examination is most useful.
If we combined the recollection element with a credibility element in
the definition of hearsay, we could simplify the process of applying the
hearsay rule and eliminate the complex structure of hearsay. By forcing
hearsay analysis into a "truth of the matter" structure, the Federal Rules of
Evidence hinder an appropriate synthesis of hearsay law. It may on occa-
sion prove difficult to distinguish testimonial tales of tales recollected
from memory from other out-of-court statements, but that is the kind of
analysis lawyers and judges are trained to do.
In no other area of law has the science of the early nineteenth century
so firmly affixed its mark. Recently, the absolute control of hearsay doc-
trine by rationalists has begun to face criticism from the perspectives of
legal pragmatism, 240 feminist jurisprudence, 241 post-modernism 24 2 and
political-choice. 243 If legal realism is to influence the future direction of
hearsay, it must embrace modern scientific insights regarding the func-
tioning of memory, and place those insights at the center of the analytic
structure of hearsay. Until then, trial lawyers and judges must continue to
grapple with the Frankenstein-like monster that hearsay has become.
An Appendix reconstructing the hearsay sections of the Federal Rules
of Evidence is provided with the understanding that it is set forth as a
tentative draft, in hopes that it will serve not as a final version, but as a
catalyst for a serious attempt to re-examine the structure of hearsay.
240. See generally Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal For a Best
Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REv. 893 (1992) (attacking hearsay doctrine from
legal pragmatist perspective).
241. See generally Orenstein, supra note 204 (attacking hearsay doctrine from
feminist jurisprudence perspective).
242. See generally Mueller, supra note 12 (attacking hearsay doctrine from post-
modernism perspective).
243. See generally J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting
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The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral er wrte s tion er (2)
non1 verbal eeonduct of a person, if it is intended by the perseln as an
Testimonial Assertion. A "testimonial assertion" is a fact sought to be
proven by crediting the purported recollection of that fact by the person
making the statement.
(b) Deelaant. A "delarant' a person wh makes a statement.
Recollection. A "recollection" is mental process of re-accessing a
memory of past events.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement- testimonial assertion, other
than one made by the deelarant while by a witness, while testifying at the
trial or hearing.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior sta-emen testimonial assertion by witness. The deeleran wit-
ness testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination
concerning the staten testimonial assertion, and the statement testimo-
nial assertion is (A) inconsistent with the-deela-an's witness's testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hear-
ing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the
deelarafl4 witness's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or im-
plied charge against the deelarant witness of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. Neither the hearsay rule, nor any other
rule of competency shall prevent admission of any The statement that is
offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an
individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement
by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
[Vol. 43: p. 529
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RULE 802. Hearsay Rule
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
common law practice, or by Act of Congress.
RULE 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Deelar-ant Witness
Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
deE4ar-afi witness is available as-a-witness:
(4) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an
evenit or eendition moade while the deelarant was pereeiving the event or
.Onditi8n, 8F i ..mediately therca. . ..fterF.
(2) exite tter-anee. A statement relating to a startfling event or eendi
t(1_ made while the delarant was onder the stress of etitement caused-
by the evenit Or On~diion.
n Thent existing ent , emeinal, or physial cnditen. A statement e
the declarat's then existingsttate of mind, emotion, ain, or physical,
eecndition (suceh as intent, plan, otive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), buit noet ineluding a statemoent of memory o~r belief to prove
the facat remembered or believed unless it relates to th utn rva
tion, identificai, or tIrms of deelarant's Nvill.
-E4 (1 Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. State-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describ-
ing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded rcollecion. A ..... ad" memo randum e aemat-
ter abcuit vhich a witness enee had knowl4edge but now has insufficient
recollection to- enab-le the wins o *t~ fully and accurately, sheiff to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the maker was fresh in
the ptiesns's memo ..y and to reflec.t that kn .. rredy. if admitted,
t1he memorandumn or record may be read into evidence but may not itself
be reeeived as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regwlarly conducted aetivity. A memorfandum, report, rec
ord, or: data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, Or Conditions, oi
ions, or diagnoses made at or near the time by, or frominomtn
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a reg
larly conducted business activty, and if it was the reglar practice of that
business activit to moake the memorandum, report, record, or dtacmp
lationl, all as shown by the testimoiny of the custodian or other qualified
witness, unaless the source of information or the method or circeumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trukster-thiness. The tefm "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, instituonation, ion -prfes
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(7) Absence of entry in reords kept in ion&e with the provisions of par
"ah (6. Evidence that amteisnt included inl the_ meomnd_ Ea, re
port, records, o~r data comfpilations, in any formF, kept in accrd-Eance with
the proviAsionis of paragraph (6) to proave nonoccratrene- or non tene
of the maker, if the matter waof a kind of whbich a mefemrandum, report,
recrz-d, or: datcoplin was reglarly made and preserved, unless the
souirces o~f information or other circumnstances inidicate lack ce
trustw',orthiness.
-(8) (2) Public records and reports. In civil cases, Rrecords, reports, state-
ments, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth (A) the aeities of the office or agency, or (B matters ob-
served pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a
duty to report, excluding, however, in cr.iminal Eases matters observed by
police officer-s and other law. enfor.ement personnel' or {GC (B) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to author-
ity granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records Of vita statistics-. -Reord6Fs Or data comfpilations, in any form,
Of births, fetal dahdahomrigeif the report thereof was made
to) a public office pursuant toreureets of law.
(10) Absence ofipublic record or entf". To proeve th hSnet-80 rdEE,
report, statement, Or data compilation, in an' form, or the nonoccu..rence
or noexistence of a matter of which a reerdE, report, statement, or dta
compilation, in any. form., Was regularly Made and preserved by a pul1ic-
office or agency, e.idence in the form of a ertificatin in accor.dan.e ith
Ruale 902, or testimony, that diligent search faldto disclose the reerd,
report, statement, or data compilation, or entry .
(11) Rrd of reigious: organitionsf. lStatemfenlt of births, malrriages,
divorcees, deaths, legitimaey, ancesty, relationship by blood or mariage,
or ther .similar fact of personal or family histo.y, contained in a reg..arly
kept record of a r-eligious organization.
(12) Maage, baptisnat and similar reetrtsSt tement  of fact con
mained in a certificate that the maker pe~fomi~ed a marriage or other cere
mony or administered a sacrament, made by) a clergman, public official,
or other person auithorized by the rules oprcieof a religious organi
zation or by law to perform the act certified, and purportCing to have been
issued at the time of the act o~r within a reasoniable time thereafter.7
(44) (3) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or fam-
ily history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tomb-
stones, or the like.
44) (4) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record
of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as
proof of the content of the original recorded document and its execution
6660
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and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if
the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute autho-
rizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
q-5) (5) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A state-
ment contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest
in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the docu-
ment, unless dealings with the property since the document was made
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of
the document.
46) (6) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Alaqrke reots, emmerial publieations. Market quotations, taba
ons, lists, directores, O other published comfilations, generally Used
and. elied upon by the publi Or by Pr ... .n prtiur Occupations.
(18) Leacd treatises. To the etent alled to the attention of an
pertwitness upen croess exiamination or relied uipen by t1he exipert witness
in direct examination, stateents contained in published treatises, period
icals, or pamphlet on a subjet of histo.y, m.ediine, or other science or
art, established as a reliable auth..i..' by the testimony o.r- admission of the
lAtess Or by Other eXpert testimonty Or: byjudicial notice. if admitted, th
statements may be read into evidence buat may not be received as exhibits.
(4-9) (7) Reputation concerning personal or family histoy. Reputation
among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage or
among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's
birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history.
{28 (8) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation
in a community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of
general history important to the community or State or nation in which
located.
-244 (9) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among associates or in the community.
+22-)-(1O)Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment, but not including when offered by the Government in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility.
{* (11) Judgment as to personal, family, or general history, or boundaries.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family, or general history, or
49
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boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.
(24) Other "expins. A statemfent not specifically covered by any-ci
the qfoegoing exceptions buit having equivalent circeumstantial g-arantecs
of trustorthiness if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as e-Adenc of a material fact; (. ) the statement is more prebaive on the
point for which it is offered than any ether evidence which the proponent
can proceure throutgh reasonable efforts; and (C) the genteral puFPoses E)
thesc rules and the initerests of justice will best be served by admission ot
the evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this ex
ception unless the propontent of it makes knowrn to the adverse party suiffi
ciendy in advance of the wfial or hearing to provide the adverse party wvith
a fair opportunity to prepare tome't he proeponent's intention to off-er
the statement and the particuilars of it, including the name and address ai
the declarant,.
RULE 804. Hearsay Exceptions: Deelarant Witness Unavailable
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of the dedaran4 statement;
or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
deelarans+ statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the de-4ar-
aetns statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has
been unable to procure the deelaf-t4 witness's attendance (or in the
case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b) (2), (3), or (4), the-de-
elarant's witness's attendance or testimony) by process or other reason-
able means.
A deelariae witness is not unavailable as a -tness if exemption, re-
fusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procure-
ment or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hear-
say rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing
of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compli-
ance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceed-
ing, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
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(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homi-
cide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a deelarant
testimonial assertion made while believing that the declarant's death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant
believed to be impending death.
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest,
or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to
render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement un-
less believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused, is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement.
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning
the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, rela-
tionship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of
personal or family history, even though declarant had no means of acquir-
ing personal knowledge of the matter stated, or (B) a statement concern-
ing the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the
declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was
so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to have accu-
rate information concerning the matter declared.
(5) Otihe cxcptions. A statement not specifically cvered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent ir-umstantial guarantees o
truistorthiness, if the ouirt determfines that (A) the statement is E~effeed1
asevdencE@ Of a maiterial fact; (9) the statement is more probative on th
p; fer . wihih it is ffered than any, other eidence whic the prpoent
ean procutre through r~easonable efforts; and (G) the general purfposes of
these rules and the interest of juistice will best be served by admission a
the statem:ent into evidence. However, a statement may noet be admitted
under this exceptieo ulcss the proponent of it makes knownf to the ad
vers e part' sufficiendy in advance of the 6-al or hearing to provide the
aderse party with a fair- pp.rtni to prepare to meet it, the propo
nnt .. inte.ntion to .ffe the Statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and addres Of the derlarant.
(Amnended, eff 12 12 75; 10 1 87; 11 18 88)
RULE 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception
to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.
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RULE 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Declarant
When a hearsay statement, r a defind in Rub 801 (d) (2,
(G), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evi-
dence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testi-
fied as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at
any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject
to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an oppor-
tunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement
has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to
examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross examination.
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